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Speech-zilla Meets Trademark Kong?: How the 
Hollywood Circuit Got It Wrong in the Barbie 
Battle, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.* 
Steven Y. Reeves** 
INTRODUCTION*** 
This comment will examine the implications of the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.1 that 
where commercial speech is “inextricably entwined” with 
noncommercial expression, such speech enjoys “full First 
Amendment protection.”2  The Barbie battle involves Mattel, 
Inc., a toy manufacturer and owner of the Barbie doll 
trademark and MCA Records, Inc., a music company and 
distributor of a song titled Barbie Girl.3  In 1997, Mattel 
commenced action, seeking protection under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 19954 (FTDA).5  MCA defended on 
First Amendment grounds and ultimately prevailed.6 
The Mattel court recognized that considerable tension 

* This comment is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** JD Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School.  For Kimberly my 
beloved – you taught me the Power of Two, and for Young-mi, my mother – 
you taught me everything else. 
*** “With Big Chief tablet readied, thick black pencil in hand, and a devil-
may-care laugh in the face of death, life on the razor’s edge sense of 
exhilaration, the [author] begins.”  Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., Inc., 147 
F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (Kent, District Judge, demonstrating the 
importance of humor in legal analysis). 
 1. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert 
denied 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003). 
 2. Id. at 906.  The text of the First Amendment protecting speech states, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 3. The Mattel court noted that “[i]f this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might 
be called Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong.”  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 898. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1125(c), 1127 (2000)) 
 5. See Mattel, 296 F.3d. at 902.  Congress enacted the FTDA in 1995 to 
amend the Lanham Act to recognize trademark dilution.  See id. at 903. 
 6. See id. at 903. 
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exists between the First Amendment and the protection offered 
by the FTDA.  The court went as far as remarking that a 
dilution injunction against purely commercial speech may “run 
afoul of the First Amendment.”7  In essence, the court found 
that the First Amendment rights of junior trademark users 
could overcome FTDA rights held by senior markholders 
regardless of the junior user’s dilutitive commercial motive.  
Where did this come from?  Under a recent Supreme Court 
opinion, commercial speech may deserve almost or as much 
protection as noncommercial speech.8  Thus, the Mattel court 
may have had a point. 
If none of the Mattel court’s reasoning until this point is 
doctrinally wrong, what is the danger?  At the outset, this note 
is not disputing the specific decision of the Mattel court that 
MCA Records was entitled to market and sell copies of the song 
Barbie Girl.9  Clearly, the song itself, and other types of speech 
like it deserve full First Amendment protection.  Rather, this 
comment discusses the sweeping scope of the Mattel court’s 
trademark dilution analysis.  Specifically, the court found that 
MCA’s use of the Barbie mark was, in fact, dilution by blurring 
under the FTDA.10  However, the court also found that MCA’s 
dilutitive use was protected under the noncommercial use 
exception as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).11  The key 
issue analyzed by the court, and the issue on which this 
comment focuses, is the intersection between trademark 
dilution rights and commercial or non-commercial use of 
trademarks in speech, and how the FTDA’s exceptions and 
limitations should be applied by future courts.  Because the 
Mattel court failed to fully analyze Mattel’s dilution injury, the 
court found that First Amendment concerns precluded Mattel’s 
FTDA claims by reason of the noncommercial use exception.  
This comment contends that the Ninth Circuit’s holding, if 
followed to its logical conclusion, heralds the end of the bulk of 
the substantive protection afforded by the FTDA.  This 

 7. Id. at 905-06 n.6. 
 8. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: 
The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 160; see also, City 
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (stating that 
“we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the ‘low value’ 
of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and 
categorical ban . . . “). 
 9. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907. 
 10. See id. at 904 n.5. 
 11. See id. at 907. 
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comment argues that if the Mattel court’s treatment of the 
FTDA is followed, many FTDA defendants will soon be crying 
out for protection of their First Amendment rights through the 
noncommercial use exception. 
This hypothesis is best illustrated by example.  Imagine 
American Standard (a manufacturer of plumbing products) 
advertises its top shelf line of products as “the Cadillac of 
toilets” and employs a visual mark substantially similar to the 
Cadillac trademark shield and wreath on its packaging and 
advertisements.  May Cadillac obtain a direct-trademark-
infringement injunction under the Lanham Act to prevent 
American Standard from using its similar mark?12  Assume 
consumers would not think Cadillac is suddenly making toilets.  
Direct-trademark-infringement injunctions require a showing 
of likelihood of confusion.13  As a result, American Standard (a 
“junior user”) could successfully argue there is little to no 
likelihood of confusion between American Standard products 
and Cadillac automobiles.  Thus, a trademark infringement 
suit would not protect Cadillac. 
Unfortunately for Cadillac, American Standard’s use of 
Cadillac’s mark presents an additional problem: eventually the 
Cadillac mark would evoke the image of a toilet—not a luxury 
car—in the minds of some consumers.14  Under the FTDA, there 
is no need to show a likelihood of confusion, mistake or 
deception.15  Furthermore, the FTDA does not require that the 
products be in competition with each other.16  The use of 

 12. Assume for the sake of argument that Cadillac can successfully defend 
the trademark status of its name and service mark. 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 14. Assuming that there is no likelihood of confusion between Cadillac 
products and the source of American Standard’s toilets, the possibility that 
there might be consumer fraud and deceit is irrelevant.  Furthermore, assume 
for the purpose of argument that the Cadillac mark has achieved 
“Supermark”-like status sufficiently famous for purposes of the FTDA.  See 2 
JEROME GILSON ET. AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5A.01[4][a] 
(2002) (defining “Supermarks” as “truly well-known and distinctive . . . 
recognize[able] by their powerful consumer product brand name association”). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000) (defining dilution as “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, 
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or 
deception”). 
 16. See id.  The lack of any relationship between the products is 
particularly interesting because it is evidence of the FTDA’s attempt to protect 
the goodwill associated with a mark, regardless of the competitive positions 
between the products. 
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Cadillac’s trademark shield would be a typical example of 
trademark dilution,17 in that a junior use could “weaken the 
‘commercial magnetism’”18 of the senior mark.  As stated by the 
Court in Mattel, “[t]he distinctiveness of the mark is 
diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior user 
alone.”19  Thus, a dilution injunction appears likely.  Indeed this 
is exactly the sort of action that dilution theory envisions. 
However, an admittedly tenuous First Amendment 
argument exists that the freedom to extol the virtues of 
American Standard products and the values such products 
espouse is within the scope of protected commercial speech.  
American Standard could claim that its speech has a socio-
political component20 and associating its toilets with Cadillac 
would emphasize the American origination of its products and 
its view that such products should be “made in the good ol’ U.S. 
of A.”  American Standard, under Mattel, could argue that 
because there is some minimal non-commercial expressive 
commentary emanating from the Cadillac trademark shield, an 
FTDA dilution injunction is precluded on the ground that the 
injunction would violate American Standard’s First 
Amendment rights.  Essentially, American Standard’s position 
would be that their message of American origination, personal 
luxury consumerism, or similar values it perceives in Cadillac’s 
brand image are messages inextricably entwined with 
American Standard’s commercial message to “buy our toilets.”  
American Standard would then argue that Cadillac consumers 
will not be confused about the source of the toilets.  Thus, there 
is no protectable consumer fraud – only Cadillac’s desire to 
protect its mark is at stake.  Therefore, American Standard 
would conclude that it should be allowed to use the Cadillac 
trademark on its packaging simply as a platform to express its 
eco-socio-political views.  Given the fact that information 
regarding economic decisions is on par with information needed 
to make political decisions,21 suppression of American 

 17. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (observing that “the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK 
aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under . . .[the FTDA] 
legislation”). 
 18. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.  “To be dilutitive, use of the mark need not 
bring to mind the junior user alone.”  Id. at 904. 
 19. Id. at 904. 
 20. There might be other precision-engineered German toilets, and 
cheaper but equally luxurious (if less soulful) Japanese toilets in this market. 
 21. Cf. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 
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Standard’s views could constitute suppression of political 
information.  This comment discusses how the FTDA should be 
wielded in order to protect the legitimate interests of famous 
mark holders.  This comment is not about the constitutional 
scope of Commercial Speech doctrine.  Instead, it will examine 
the implications of Mattel to owners of so called 
“Supermarks.”22  As demonstrated by the Cadillac example 
above, the Mattel court’s hasty decision to confer First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech that is 
inextricably entwined with non-commercial speech led it to an 
unwieldy conclusion.  Properly defining the scope of the non-
commercial use exception is therefore essential to protecting 
owners of famous trademarks. 
In Section I, this comment will examine the history of 
trademark dilution theory to emphasize that dilution theory 
protects the mark holder’s investment in that mark.  Section I 
will also discuss the FTDA and its individual structure and 
provisions.  Section I will conclude by briefly exploring the 
commercial speech doctrine to show that the current status of 
commercial speech compared to non-commercial speech is 
unclear.  Section II will discuss the Mattel decision itself.  
Finally, section III contends that the Mattel court’s analysis of 
the FTDA’s intersection with the commercial speech doctrine is 

UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (2000).  Post discusses in general the distinctions and 
boundaries between Commercial Speech and Public discourse.  Although Post 
concludes that the distinction lies in the information function of public 
discourse, he does make the argument that an advertisement of commercial 
prices plays as important a role in information dissemination as a newspaper 
editorial: 
A newspaper editorial discussing drug prices would be protected as 
public discourse, because it would be regarded as an effort to 
participate in this public communicative sphere in a manner that 
enacts the constitutional value of democratic self-governance.  A 
pharmacist advertising drug prices in that same newspaper, however, 
would not be regarded as a participant in public discourse, because 
her speech would not be deemed to enact the value of democratic self-
governance.  Nevertheless the pharmacist’s advertisement, no less 
than the newspaper’s editorial, would disseminate information to the 
public at large and in this way serve the important constitutional 
function of sustaining the public communicative sphere.  This is an 
essential insight of commercial speech doctrine. 
Id.  Cf. William Safire, In Material Breech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A25 
(arguing that the upcoming U.N. decision to hold Iraq “in material breach” of 
armaments agreements is based on economic considerations, rather than on 
moral or human rights grounds). 
 22. See GILSON, supra note 14.  For a non-exhaustive but informative list 
of potential “Supermarks,” see THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 
2003, at 718-19. 
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fundamentally flawed, even though the result produced is 
correct.  Furthermore, this section will argue that the 
implications of the court’s flawed analysis are far reaching 
because the First Amendment becomes an overly powerful 
defensive tool against trademark dilution claims.  In effect, the 
Mattel decision may marginalize the “landmark upgrade”23 the 
FTDA has given senior mark holders seeking to protect their 
investment. 
The position of this comment is that the Mattel court 
should have fully analyzed both types of dilution injury, 
blurring and tarnishment, because each type of dilution may 
invoke different levels of First Amendment protection.  
Furthermore, the court should have recognized that MCA’s 
First Amendment rights heavily outweighed Mattel’s 
tarnishment claims.  If the court had adopted this analysis, 
future FTDA claimants primarily alleging blurring injuries 
could show that the junior user’s First Amendment commercial 
speech concerns were not substantial enough to overcome a 
senior mark holder’s FTDA rights.  Using the Cadillac 
hypothetical, American Standard’s argument that it is using 
Cadillac’s mark to espouse socio-political views would fail 
because Cadillac’s interest in its mark is substantially more 
significant that American Standard’s interest in using the 
Cadillac mark to represent its views.  This comment concludes, 
in any event, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that when commercial 
and non-commercial speech is “inextricably entwined,” should 
be construed narrowly.  Any other reading would render FTDA 
rights insignificant because the First Amendment will be a 
slam-dunk defense for almost any FTDA defendant. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. ORIGINS OF TRADEMARK DILUTION 
The key to understanding trademark dilution lies in the 
reader’s appreciation for the historical impetus behind dilution 
theory.  Trademark law in the United States is a relatively 
recent phenomenon.24  Dilution theory appeared in the United 

 23. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1]. 
 24. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the 
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 797-98 
(1997) (according to Klieger, trademarks did not become essential to commerce 
until the industrial revolution.  Furthermore, Congress did not enact 
trademark legislation until 1870).  Klieger argues that protecting marks from 
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States in 1927,25 when Frank Schechter published a new theory 
for dilution as a cause of action.26  Schechter argued that the 
then-current focus on preventing consumer confusion as a 
rationale for trademark protection27 should be dropped in favor 
of protection based on the uniqueness of the mark.28  Schechter 
claimed that the “real injury” to mark holders resulting from 
use of “similar marks on non-competing goods” was the 
“gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold 
upon the public mind.”29  Schechter’s uniqueness theory has 
been characterized as a “radical business-friendly alternative to 
consumer confusion, . . . [that] redefined trademark rights as in 
gross property rights and infringement actions as 
misappropriation actions.”30 

dilution increases barriers to competition and that dilution laws are 
anticompetitive.  Id. at 860-63.  Klieger’s argument is not without merit, but is 
beyond the scope of this article.  However, Klieger’s extensive examination of 
the historical origin of trademark dilution law and the economic value of 
trademarks is invaluable.  Thus, Klieger’s article is generally cited throughout 
with this contradiction in mind.  After the first federal trademark legislation 
was enacted in 1870, the United States Supreme Court declared the statute 
unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark Cases.  See id. at 798 (citing 100 U.S. 82, 
99 (1879)).  In 1881, Congress tried again, permitting registration to 
trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and Indian tribes, but 
without a provision for registration of marks used in interstate commerce.  Id. 
(citing Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502).  It was not until the 
Trademark Act of 1905 that a federal registration scheme affected marks used 
in interstate commerce.  See id. (citing Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 
724).  The 1905 Act was in effect until the Lanham Act, the modern federal 
trademark statute, was enacted in 1946.  See id. (citing Lanham Trade-Mark 
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996))). 
 25. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 801 (noting that “[d]ilution theory 
originated in Frank Schechter’s 1927 article The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection”).  Trademark dilution theory first appeared in Germany.  See id. at 
805-06.  For a more extensive discussion of the German origins of trademark 
dilution theory, see generally TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION, 4-6 
(1996) (citing the German Odol case). 
 26. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 
40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). 
 27. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 796.  But see Schechter, supra note 26, 
at 814 (noting that “[i]t has been repeatedly pointed out by the very courts 
that insist on defining trademarks in terms of ownership or origin that . . .  the 
source or origin of the goods bearing a well known trademark is seldom known 
to the consumer”). 
 28. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 831 (insisting that “the preservation 
of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for 
its protection”). 
 29. Schechter, supra note 26, at 825. 
 30. Klieger, supra note 24, at 805-06. 
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Schechter’s uniqueness rationale for trademark dilution 
was attractive, in part, because of the pressure generated by 
the rapid expansion of trade at the end of the nineteenth 
century.31  However, Schechter’s new theory, based on 
protecting a mark’s uniqueness, was premature.32  Indeed, just 
one year after Schechter’s article, the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that the consumer confusion rationale extended 
to dissimilar goods.33  In 1946, the consumer confusion 
rationale for trademark protection was formally adopted by the 
Lanham Act,34 which prohibited the use of a trademark that is 
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”35  
Thus, at least on the federal level, Schechter’s theory was 
ignored.36 
However, the general idea that unique “trademark[s] may 
be weakened or reduced by unapproved uses”37 lived on through 
various state “anti-dilution”38 statutes.39  As the twentieth 

 31. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 853-54.  Klieger noted that “[a]s product 
choices [during the Industrial Revolution] expanded and retailers became 
middlemen in market transactions, producers and consumers came to rely on 
trademarks. . . .”  Id. at 854. 
 32. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 807-08.  Klieger explained that: 
In the two decades immediately following Schechter’s dilution 
proposal, courts, and eventually Congress, eliminated the direct 
competition requirement that had prevented trademark law from 
matching trade realities.  By the second half of the twentieth century, 
few could question the degree to which the consumer confusion test 
protected the source and quality identification functions of 
trademarks and, at least indirectly, safeguarded trademarks’ 
advertising function as well. 
Id. at 808. 
 33. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 808 (citing Yale Electric Corp. v. 
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) (stating “[a]nd so it has come to be 
recognized that, unless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to 
insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful”)). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000)). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
 36. See Natalie A. Dopson, Note, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and 
Its Effect on Parody: No Laughing Matter, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 539, 545 
(1998). 
 37. Id. at 542. 
 38. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1] n.1.  Gilson notes that these laws 
were originally called “anti-dilution” statutes because they were against 
dilution, but under the FTDA the “anti” was eliminated, even though some 
courts continue to refer to such statutes as “anti-dilution.” 
 39. See Dopson, supra note 36, at 545-46.  Dopson chronicles the early 
state anti-dilution statutes, beginning with a Massachusetts statute, Act of 
May 2, 1947, ch. 307, §7(a), enacted one year after the Lanham Act.  Id.  
Dopson notes that “in 1964, the United States Trademark Association 
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century American economy progressed from an agrarian to 
industrial base, the reliance on and use of trademarks became 
more widespread and frequent.40  Manufacturers (trademark 
holders) increasingly sold their goods at a regional or national 
level.41  Manufacturers relied more on their marks for source 
identification purposes and sought protection for their unique 
marks by preventing unauthorized uses.42  Unfortunately, the 
“patch-quilt system of protection” provided by existing state 
anti-dilution laws led to inconsistent protection for these 
manufacturers.43  In addition, the expanding number of state 
anti-dilution statutes was often “curiously misconstrued and 
emasculated by the courts.”44  Those courts often required a 
showing of likelihood of confusion even though a hallmark of 
dilution theory is an absence of consumer confusion.45 

included dilution in its Model State Trademark Bill” and that by 1996 when 
the FTDA was enacted, “28 states had adopted anti-dilution statutes.”  Id. at 
546. 
 40. See Anthony Pearson, Note, Commercial Trademark Parody, The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and the First Amendment, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 
973, 983 n.66 (1998); and Klieger, supra note 24, at 853-54. 
 41. See Pearson, supra note 40, at 983. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.  The House Judiciary Committee noted that court 
decisions have been “inconsistent and some courts are reluctant to grant 
nationwide injunctions for violations of state law. . . .”  Id. at 3-4.  
Furthermore, the Committee disapprovingly noted that the inconsistencies 
“simply encourage[d] forum-shopping and increase[d] the amount of 
litigation.”  Id. at 4. 
 44. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 689 (3rd ed. 2001).  Ginsburg refers here to the 
confusion often seen between trademark infringement and trademark dilution 
actions.  Courts often insisted that a plaintiff show a likelihood of confusion in 
a dilution action.  See id. at 689-90.  Ginsburg asserts that this view was 
incorrect and that “[n]umerous opinions since [Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied 
Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977)] have noted the prevalent 
errors of prior opinions, particularly those which required a likelihood of 
confusion.”  Id. at 690. 
 45. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 821-22.  Schechter argues: 
No necessity or justification for the protection of marks on non-
competing goods is seen except (1) where, while there is no actual 
diversion of trade, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of 
the infringing goods; (2) where the use of the infringing mark or name 
may work some discredit and financial liability or other similar 
concrete injury on the plaintiff.  Thus, a recent writer states: 
Where there are no circumstances that would cause the public 
to think the products bearing the same name were made by the 
same party, no wrong is done.  The classic example given in 
Ainswortlh v. Walmsley: “If he does not carry on a trade in iron, 
but carries on a trade in linen and stamps a lion on his linen, 
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In 1977, the New York Court of Appeals in Allied 
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.,46 reversed 
the course of common judicial interpretation of the dilution 
concept.47  The Allied Maintenance court defined dilution as 
“the whittling away of an established trade-mark’s selling 
power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon 
dissimilar products.”48  This definition is remarkably similar to 
Frank Schechter’s uniqueness concept and was founded on a 
belief in the property-like value of unique trademarks.49  More 
importantly, the Allied Maintenance court explicitly noted that 
a dilution injunction could be had even in the absence of a 
showing of “competition or confusion.”50  The Allied 

another person may stamp a lion on iron,” is still the law. 
This conclusion that “no wrong is done” is based upon an archaic 
notion of the function of a trademark as solely indicating “source or 
origin.”  It assumes that “the elementary equitable principle upon 
which the whole law of this subject is based . . . is that one may not 
palm off his goods as the goods of another” and that the sole injury 
resulting from the use of the same “lion” mark on linen and iron 
might be a confusion as to the source of these two dissimilar products.  
It ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom, rather 
than the designation of source, is the primary purpose of the 
trademark today, and that the preservation of the uniqueness or 
individuality of the trademark is of paramount importance to its 
owner. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 46. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977). 
 47. See GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 689-90; see Allied Maint., 369 N.E.2d 
at 1165 (noting that “[g]enerally, courts which have had the opportunity to 
interpret an anti-dilution statute have refused to apply its provisions 
literally . . . [and] have read into the statute a requirement of some showing of 
confusion, fraud or deception”). 
 48. 369 N.E.2d at 1164.  Note the resemblance to Schechter’s dispersion 
language.  See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 49. Compare 369 N.E.2d at 1165 (noting that the legislature sought to 
protect businesses from the “cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or 
services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive 
trademark”) with Schechter, supra note 26, at 823  (arguing that “this rule 
that a trademark must be appurtenant to a going concern should not in any 
way set limits to the extent of protection of such a mark when so 
appurtenant”).  See also Pearson, supra note 40, at 982 (positing that 
“[t]rademark law . . . protects the trademark owner’s property rights . . . 
[which are] derive[d] from the trademark’s ability to further the owner’s 
business . . . “). 
 50. See Allied Maint., at 1165.  The court reasoned that: 
Since an action for infringement as well as an action for unfair 
competition both require a showing that the public is likely to confuse 
the defendant’s product or service with that of the plaintiff, relief may 
be difficult to secure in situations in which the parties are not in 
competition, nor produce similar products or perform similar services. 
It is for this reason that [N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (1968)] 
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Maintenance court’s definition of dilution has been adopted, by 
both state and federal courts although the misconception that 
parties must show a likelihood of confusion “curiously and 
repetitively persists . . . in the jurisdictions where the dawn of 
anti-dilution enlightenment currently seems to shine 
brightest.”51  The Allied Maintenance court’s rationale for 
preventing dilution of the mark’s intrinsic value52 was not 
widely accepted53 until the FTDA incorporated a similar 
rationale.54  In fact, by the time the FTDA was enacted, only 
about half of the states had any form of protection against 
dilution.55 
B. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT 
1. First, the Act. 
Not until 1996, when the FTDA was enacted, did a federal 

specifically provides that an injunction may be obtained 
notwithstanding the absence of competition or confusion. 
Id. 
 51. GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 690.  Note here that the Mattel court did 
not fall into this trap.  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.  Instead, the Mattel court 
carefully contrasted trademark infringement from trademark dilution, and 
observed that with dilution “the injury . . . usually occurs when consumers 
aren’t confused about the source of a product.”  Id. 
 52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 53. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1].  Gilson notes that: 
Two facets of the FTDA explain why courts have been unenthusiastic 
about dilution law. First, the public policy underlying the Dilution Act 
stands in sharp contrast to that underlying the law of trademark 
infringement. Under the latter, the twin policy reasons behind the 
law are to protect the goodwill property rights of the trademark 
owner and the corresponding right of the public to be free from 
confusion, deception and mistake. The Dilution Act, on the other 
hand, protects only a private interest, and a narrow one at that: the 
distinctiveness of the owner’s famous trademark. At least in cases 
where there is no simultaneous likelihood of confusion, there is no 
identifiable benefit to the public.  Second, taken to its extreme, the 
FTDA suggests that federal law now requires or condones trademark 
protection in gross, a concept that is completely alien to a century of 
trademark jurisprudence. 
Id.  In response to the first argument, see infra text accompanying notes 76, 
77.  In response to the second argument, see infra text accompanying notes 61-
63. 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1030 (relying on a California court’s observation that “dilution is an 
infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising 
value of the mark”). 
 55. See id. (noting that “only approximately 25 states have laws that 
prohibit trademark dilution”). 
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cause of action exist to protect mark holders from a Schechter-
type concept of dilution based on a mark’s protectable 
uniqueness.56  Under the Act, unlike state anti-dilution 
measures, a nationwide injunction could now be issued with 
uniformity and consistency.57  The FTDA has been described as 
a “landmark upgrade of a legal concept that has been around 
for decades and that, with some exceptions, has been largely 
ineffectual.”58 
The FTDA defines dilution as, “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) 
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other 
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”59  
It is important to note again that, in contrast to trademark 
infringement, dilution can arise even where there is no 
likelihood of confusion.60  Dilution actions require that the 
injured mark be sufficiently famous61 and sufficiently 
distinctive.62  Thus, the FTDA has limited applicability.63 
The FTDA provides a cause of action for a “commercial use 
in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after 
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark.”64  Typically, the Act allows only 

 56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).  The FTDA uses the phrase 
“distinctive quality” to incorporate the concept of uniqueness.  Id. (stating that 
“[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against 
another person’s [use of that mark] . . . if such use . . . causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark . . . “). 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1030. 
 58. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[1]. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
 60. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 61. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][a] (discussing “Supermarks”). 
 62. See generally, GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][c][i][A]-[B].  Gilson 
explores in depth the requirement of distinctiveness beyond mere famousness.  
Id. § 5A.01[4][c][i][A].  Gilson concludes, based on explicit legislative history, 
that marks with acquired distinctiveness are subject to protection under the 
FTDA.  Id. § 5A.01[4][c][i][B] (remarking that “the House Report states that 
Section 43(c)(1)(A) ‘makes it clear that a mark may be deemed famous even if 
not inherently distinctive’”) (some internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 63. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999).  
The court noted that the “distinctiveness” of the mark is an “important 
limitation” because two thresholds limit the scope of a dilution injunction: 
distinctiveness and fame.  Id.  Thus, the potential for abuse of dilution 
injunction is lowered. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).  Note here that the degree to which a 
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injunctive relief for plaintiffs who own famous marks.65  If, 
however, the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the 
owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of a famous mark” the 
plaintiff may recover damages.66  This is, in part, recognition of 
the theory that trademark rights are analogous to private 
property rights in that efficient use of that property depends on 
parcelization.67  If First Amendment rights are allowed to 
overcome dilution theory through First Amendment protection 
of commercial speech, then Congress would be faced with the 
notion that trademarks are communal property used for 
commercial purposes by anyone interested in participating in 
the economic process.  This leads to a less efficient use of 
resources and clearly cannot be in the best interests of the 
public good.68  Although Congress did not explicitly adopt this 
line of reasoning, it is clear from the legislative history that 
Congress was attempting to protect trademark rights of 
individual entities, and that it believed that trademarks were 
not communal property.69 

plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant caused dilution by a showing 
of actual harm or an inference of likely harm was the subject of significant 
controversy among the circuits.  See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 123 
S.Ct. 1115, 1120-22 (2003) (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), for the 
actual harm standard and Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208, for the competing inference 
of likely harm standard).  However, a unanimous court resolved this question 
and found that the FTDA plainly required a showing of “actual dilution.”  Id. 
at 1124.  The Court qualified its holding by noting that the FTDA did not 
require plaintiffs to show “an actual loss of sales or profits.”  Id 
 65. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000). 
 66. Id.  Note here that damages are defined as “recover[y of] (1) 
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the 
costs of the action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).  Furthermore, the “court may 
order that [the dilutitive material] shall be delivered up and destroyed.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1118 (2000). 
 67. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND 
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS, 126-35, 156-73 (2001).  Komesar offers 
an explanation of the reasons why property rights are more efficient when 
parceled out and attempts to explain the problems that result as the number 
of participants and the complexity of systems increases.  Id. at 127-33.  
Komesar presents tough institutional choices faced by courts and legislatures 
and argues that as numbers increase, there will be a shift “from informal to 
formal mechanisms of enforcement and a shift within formal mechanisms 
from common law courts to political process regulation.”  Id. at 133.  Komesar 
notes that this produces an increased likelihood of complicated balancing tests 
that attempt to accommodate flexible and uncertain inquiry.  See id. at 158. 
 68. See id. at 128-33. 
 69. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1031 (characterizing the United States as “a leader setting the 
standards for strong worldwide protection of intellectual property”-a position 
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The FTDA provides four affirmative defenses: (1) 
ownership by the defendant of a valid federal registration;70 (2) 
fair use of another’s mark in a comparative advertisement to 
identify competing goods or services;71 (3) noncommercial use of 
another’s mark;72 and (4) use of another’s mark in news 
reporting and news commentary.73  As explained later in this 
comment, the Mattel court’s decision (and the focus of this 
comment) was based on its analysis of the scope of the 
noncommercial use exception in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B).74 
Although the FTDA’s scope is limited, some circuits and 
scholars are hostile to the Act’s protection for dilution because 
they do not see any benefit to the consumer public.75  Others, 
however, argue that protection from dilution is needed because 
the consumer public is harmed when they cannot identify 
brands with specific products or services.76  For instance, part of 
the purchase price of branded goods and services includes the 
goodwill value of the mark.  If a trademark is diluted and its 

it could not adopt if Congress did not believe that trademark rights were not 
important personal property-like rights). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2000). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C). 
 74. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied 2003 WL 167680 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003) (arguing that 
“[w]hereas trademark law targets ‘interference with the source signaling 
function’ of trademarks, dilution protects owners ‘from an appropriation of or 
free riding on’ the substantial investment that they have made in their marks” 
(quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998))). 
 75. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[4][c][i][B] (noting that “the 
ambiguity found by the Second Circuit in such straightforward statutory 
language reflects the court’s hostility to the [FTDA’s] broad protections”); see 
also GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 693-96 (presenting excerpts of Milton W. 
Hollander, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatable with the National 
Protection of Trademark?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 273-74, 276-81, 285-87 
(1985)). 
 76. See generally Kimberly L. Muller, A Position of Advocacy in Support of 
Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 
175 (1993).  Muller notes in particular three principal rationales (among 
others) for protecting trademarks owners from dilution: 
(1) Trademarks are valuable tools which enable consumers to repetitively 
purchase goods of consistent qualities; (2) [i]nvestment in valuable trademark 
assets by mark holders is vital to encourage a healthy and robust economy; 
[and] (3) [t]he law recognizes that the trademark property of one party should 
not be freely taken by another party without permission. 
Id. at 175.  But see generally Paul C. Van Slyke, State Laws Against 
Trademark Dilution: Why They Should Not Be Preempted By the Lanham Act, 
83 TRADEMARK REP. 197 (1993). 
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goodwill diminished, then it is possible that the consumer 
would not have paid the original purchase price—instead the 
purchaser would have paid a lower price commensurate with 
the good’s lack of attached brand distinction.77  In a sense, this 
is an issue of consumer protection.  There is no doubt that the 
mark holder will receive the major benefit of FTDA protection, 
but ultimately, protecting the mark from dilution fosters 
investment in the development of such marks and this 
increases their total value to society.  But what exactly is 
dilution and how does it protect trademarks? 
2. Then, Dilution explained. 
Dilution under the FTDA can occur through blurring or 
tarnishment.78  Blurring occurs when a junior user relies on the 
senior user’s mark to identify the junior user’s goods or 
services, thus “raising the possibility that the mark will lose its 
ability to serve as a unique identifier of the [senior user’s] 
products.”79  Currently, blurring analysis under the FTDA is 
best illustrated by the Nabisco test.80  The Nabisco court upheld 
a dilution injunction because “Pepperidge Farm is likely to 
succeed in establishing that Nabisco’s use of its goldfish shape 

 77. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 862 (arguing that “[d]ilution protection 
thus encourages companies to invest more than they otherwise might in the 
creation of intangible associations”). 
 78. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6] at n.220 (quoting Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Baily Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 
F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999) (“finding that the FTDA’s legislative history 
‘indicates that Congress understood that dilution might result either from 
uses that blur the distinctiveness of [a famous] mark or [that] tarnish or 
disparage it”)); see also, Pearson, supra note 40, at 986-90 (explaining the 
historical and practical application of the theories behind blurring (as a loss of 
distinctiveness) and tarnishment (as a species of loss of business reputation)). 
 79. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[5][a]. 
 80. Id., § 5A.01[5][d].  The Nabisco factors used to determine likelihood of 
dilution are: (1) “the distinctiveness of the senior mark;” (2) “the similarity of 
the marks;” (3) “the proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging 
the gap;” (4) “the interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior 
mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products;” (5) 
“shared consumers and geographical limitations;” (6) “sophistication of 
consumers;” (7) “actual confusion;” (8) “adjectival or referential quality of the 
junior use;” (9) “harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user;” and (10) 
“effect of the senior user’s prior laxity in protecting the mark.”  Nabisco, Inc. v. 
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999).  The Nabiso Court noted 
that its list of factors was non-exclusive and should be refined over time.  Id. 
at 227-28.  However, Gilson notes that some of these factors have been 
criticized as being largely relevant to a likelihood of confusion analysis, for 
instance, the third factor, proximity of the products.  GILSON, supra note 14, § 
5A.01[5][d][xi]. 
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in an orange, cheddar-cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker 
dilutes the distinctive quality of Pepperidge Farm’s previously 
famous mark, consisting of a goldfish-shaped orange, cheddar-
cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker.”81  Nabisco is particularly 
interesting because it demonstrates how powerful the FTDA 
can be: Pepperidge Farm prevailed solely on an FTDA dilution 
claim82 and halted Nabisco’s entry into Pepperidge Farm’s 
coveted goldfish cracker market, estimated to be worth more 
than $200 million.83 
Tarnishment traditionally occurs when a mark is 
associated with a “shoddy or poor quality product” or 
“portrayed in an unflattering or unsavory way.”84  Under the 
FTDA, tarnishment is explicitly included as a distinct injury 
not requiring likelihood of confusion.85  The boundaries of 
tarnishment actions have not yet been defined under the 
FTDA, but generally where the mark is “associated with 
obscenity, sexual activity or criminal activity, a court is far 
more likely to find that [the mark] has been tarnished.”86  
However, “tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct.”87 

 81. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217. 
 82. Id. at 213 (noting that “[t]he district court found for Pepperidge and 
granted the preliminary injunction on the federal and state dilution claims, 
but not on the federal trademark infringement or state unfair competition 
claims”) (emphasis added). 
 83. Id.  Interestingly, Pepperidge Farms apparently spent (between 1995 
and 1998) $120 million marketing goldfish crackers in order to double net 
sales of Goldfish crackers to $200 million in 1998.  Id. at 212-13.  This further 
emphasizes a trademark’s intrinsic value as a marketing tool. 
 84. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][a]; cf Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2003) (noting that “[tarnishing] is not a necessary 
consequence of mental association”). 
 85. See GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][b]. 
 86. Id.  Gilson notes a statement from the Trademark Review Commission 
that proposed what ultimately became the FTDA.  Id. (stating “[i]n general, 
those which tend to amuse or parody, and are not likely to confuse, are not 
actionable.  Those which are disgusting, vulgar and no laughing matter often 
are”). 
 87. Id. at § 5A.01[6][b] (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson 
Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996)); cf. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.1979) (holding film 
distributor liable for using Dallas Cowboys cheerleader uniform in 
pornographic film; the record showed that the actress wearing the 
trademarked uniform had never been a Dallas Cowboys cheerleader).  Some 
commentators have argued that Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders was wrongly 
decided because the film’s expression was never found to be obscene under the 
First Amendment.  See Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay 
Olympics Case, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 604, 621-26  (1989) (this article was 
originally published under the same title in 69 B.U. L. REV. 131 (1989)).  
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In, American Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Productions, 
Inc.,88 the Minnesota District Court found tarnishment of 
American Dairy Queen’s (ADQ) wholesome trademark by a film 
“mockumentary” that New Line Productions planned to title 
“Dairy Queens.”89  New Line’s film satirized a Mid-western 
beauty pageant in a potentially offensive light.90  The court 
granted a dilution injunction notwithstanding New Line’s 
argument that an injunction would infringe on its expressive 
First Amendment right to choose whatever title it wanted.91  
The court was swayed by ADQ’s argument that it did not seek 
to alter any of the film’s dialogue or expressive content; instead, 
ADQ “simply want[ed] to keep the public from developing the 
sense that it [was] a sponsor or endorser of New Line’s film.”92 
As is evident from the above discussion, the FTDA 
implicates First Amendment concerns.  The expressive content 
of the junior user’s use raised First Amendment concerns in 
Am. Dairy Queen, but not in Nabisco.  Is there a difference?  If 
so, where does the FTDA intersect the First Amendment? 
3. Diluting Dilution: One Part Blurring and One Part 
Tarnishment. 
It appears that dilution actions resting on tarnishment 
claims potentially implicate the First Amendment more 
directly than blurring claims.93  As one court noted, “[u]se of 

According to those commentators, the film distributor should have won 
because “mere tarnishment arising from free trade in ideas outside the realm 
of commercial advertising should be considered an unrecognizable harm.”  Id. 
at 624 n.94. 
 88. 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 89. Id. at 728, 733. 
 90. See id. at 728-29 (remarking that “the movie portrays [local beauty] 
contests as filled with backbiting and jealousy, and suggests the participants 
tend to suffer from eating disorders . . . and contain[s] off-color humor . . . 
which may offend many . . . viewers”). 
 91. See id. at 733. 
 92. Id.  Indeed, the court contended that ADQ’s argument was 
strengthened by New Line’s denial that “its use of the ‘Dairy Queens’ name 
[was] designed to evoke or even suggest any relationship at all to ADQ[.]”  Id. 
at 734.  The court noted that if New Line has chosen the title specifically to 
comment on ADQ, then its First Amendment argument might have carried 
more weight because no alternative avenues of expression would exist.  Id. at 
734-35. 
 93. Cf. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[5][a].  Gilson implies that dilutitive 
blurring in ordinary business competition does not raise First Amendment 
concerns because blurring is confined to “when the defendant uses or modifies 
the plaintiff’s famous trademark to identify the defendant’s goods or services.”  
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another’s trademark is entitled to First Amendment protection 
only when the use of that mark is part of a communicative 
message, not when it is used merely to identify the source of a 
product.”94  Thus, when courts construe the intersection 
between FTDA rights and the First Amendment, careful 
consideration of the type and context of the alleged dilution is 
particularly important.95 
Blurring claims generally involve business competition 
motives.  The junior user is, in a sense, trading on the goodwill 
of the senior user’s mark to sell its goods.  For example, 
Nabisco was clearly attempting to trade on the distinctiveness 

Id. (emphasis added).  Thus the “harm is to the famous mark” and not 
consumers.  Id. § 5A.01[5][b].  In contrast, Gilson observes “[p]ast 
[tarnishment] decisions preventing the use of a mark in puns, satire and 
parody have raised genuine issues of free speech.”  Id. § 5A.01[6][b] (emphasis 
added).  Gilson concludes that the FTDA’s noncommercial use exemption 
specifically relieves this tension.  Id. 
 94. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 197-98 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added).  In OBH, a newspaper (The Buffalo News) 
sought a dilution injunction against a website operator using the domain 
name “www.thebuffalonews.com” to lead consumers to a website disparaging 
the newspaper.  Id. at 181-183.  The court, using the Second Circuit’s Nabisco 
factors, determined that the plaintiff was injured by a blurring effect, where 
the consumer is momentarily led to associate the domain name (hence 
plaintiff’s mark) with the defendant’s own website.  See id. at 193-96.  This 
“initial interest confusion” is dilutitive, even though there was no actual 
confusion, and notwithstanding the explicit disclaimer posted on the 
defendant’s website.  See id. at 195.  The court analyzed the plaintiff’s injury 
in a “particularistic, context sensitive” manner and held that the defendant’s 
First Amendment defense was without merit because the plaintiffs “[did] not 
seek . . . to restrain defendants from speech that criticizes The Buffalo News.”  
Id. at 197. 
 95. See e.g., id.  The court found that the blurring injury was strong and 
the remedy limited in a manner sufficient to outweigh any First Amendment 
rights of the defendant to name his website using the plaintiff’s mark.  
Similarly, in Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 733-35, the defendant’s 
crucial assertion that the title itself did not contain any expressive content 
referring to ADQ allowed the court to enjoin the defendant’s tarnishing use of 
ADQ’s mark.  Am. Dairy Queen is particularly interesting because a 
tarnishment injury implicates stronger First Amendment rights—generally 
tarnishment includes some expression about the mark, whereas blurring is 
simply use of the mark.  The court noted that if there had been expressive 
content in the title, the injury suffered by ADQ might not have outweighed 
New Line’s First Amendment interests.  Thus, even though the alleged injury 
was tarnishment, the Am. Dairy Queen court correctly found that the 
plaintiff’s mark was impermissibly diluted given the contextual use of ADQ’s 
mark.  Cf. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 
1167 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that defendant’s use of “ballysucks” as part of 
his domain name was protected by First Amendment in trademark action 
brought by “Bally” trademark holder). 
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of Pepperidge Farm’s trademarked “[goldfish-shaped] orange, 
cheddar-cheese-flavored, bite-sized cracker”96 in Nabisco.97  By 
comparison, the Am. Dairy Queen court, examining a 
tarnishment injury, could not conclusively state that New Line 
was attempting to trade on ADQ’s goodwill because New Line 
offered to append disclaimers to its marketing materials.98  
Instead, the court examined ADQ’s tarnishment claim and 
weighed it against New Line’s First Amendment rights.99  
Although ADQ prevailed, the court considered it a crucial 
distinction that New Line argued: “the [f]ilm’s title is not 
intended to in any way suggest [or] refer to” ADQ’s image.100  
New Line’s complete lack of expressive intent was fatal.101  If 
New Line had alleged some artistic relevance to its title choice, 
it is likely that the Am. Dairy Queen court would have found in 
favor of New Line.102 
These cases suggest that dilution depends on the relative 
interests and rights of the junior and senior user.  A junior user 
trading on a senior mark’s goodwill for its competitive business 
interests infringes on the senior user’s FTDA rights.  The use 
by the junior user is generally limited to commercial speech—in 
other words, “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker.”103  In contrast, a junior user relying on 
the senior mark’s goodwill to comment on that mark (through 
parody, satire, association with seamy conduct, or portrayal in 
an unflattering manner), implicates non-commercial First 
Amendment rights.104  Thus, any FTDA rights can potentially 
be outweighed by the public’s interest in expressive freedom 
depending on whether the tarnishment is expressive or non-

 96. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217. 
 97. Id. at 218 (contending that “[n]ot withstanding slight differences in 
shape, size and marking . . . [the differences] would not be easily noticed, 
except on a close inspection of a sort that is not likely to be performed by one 
who is intent on popping the crackers into his mouth”). 
 98. See Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 732. 
 99. See id. at 732-35. 
 100. Id. at 734 (quoting Mem. in Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 5). 
 101. See id. at 734-35 (stating that “[t]he idea expressed is not a reference 
to [ADQ’s] mark.  Absent such relevance, the Court concludes that alternative 
avenues for expressing the idea exist”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 561 (1980) (defining commercial speech). 
 104. Cf. GILSON, supra note 14, § 5A.01[6][b] (observing that “past 
decisions preventing the use of a mark in puns, satire and parody have raised 
genuine issues of free speech”). 
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expressive.105  This is a distinctly different view from the Mattel 
court’s view that any expressive content absolutely precludes 
an FTDA injunction.106 
What makes the distinction between non-expressive 
tarnishment and expressive tarnishment important is that the 
non-expressive use can occur within the context of protected 
First Amendment speech.  The Fifth Circuit, in Westchester 
Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,107 found that the title of the 
magazine was “expressive to an appreciable degree . . . 
[requiring] more protection than the labeling of ordinary 
commercial products.”108  The Westchester Media court 
determined that the senior user had not shown proof of actual 
dilution109 and found that there was no legitimate FTDA claim, 
but nevertheless the court clearly recognized that the 
magazine’s non-expressive use was limited notwithstanding the 
magazine’s otherwise unfettered expressive use right to use the 
mark.110  The court suggested that the appropriate remedy may 
be “not less speech, but more” and ordered consideration of 
disclaimer relief.111  The court noted that the disclaimer relief 
was particularly effective in this case because the “markets for 
both PRL’s products and Westchester’s magazine consist of 
relatively sophisticated buyers.”112  Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s 
complete analysis resulted in adequate recognition of PRL’s 
mark while at the same time protecting Westchester Media’s 
First Amendment rights. 
Before analyzing the Mattel court’s opinion in light of the 
distinction between blurring and tarnishment, the First 
Amendment must be addressed.  What is the current status of 
the commercial speech doctrine?  Does commercial speech 

 105. Cf. Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734 (explaining that “the 
argument that there is no other way to express the idea of the film’s title 
carries much less weight”). 
 106. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir. 
2002); cf. infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 107. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (designer Ralph Lauren and owner of 
“Polo” trademark sued publisher of magazine titled “Polo”). 
 108. Id. at 672. 
 109. See id. at 671.  The “proof of actual dilution” issue has since been 
resolved.  See supra note 64 and discussion relating to Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc. 123 S.Ct. 1115, (2003). 
 110. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 673-74 (requiring disclaimer relief 
to be considered).  The Fifth Circuit noted that PRL claimed dilution by 
blurring and tarnishment.  Id. at 670 n.12. 
 111. Id. at 675 (supporting its suggestion for disclaimer relief). 
 112. Id. at 674. 
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deserve different treatment than non-commercial expression? 
4. Now, the First Amendment. 
Life began113 for the commercial speech doctrine in 1942114 
when the United States Supreme Court ruled that commercial 
speech fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection.115  
In 1976, the Supreme Court reversed Chrestensen in Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.116  Virginia Pharmacy spawned the modern 

 113. Just like the early days of Schecter’s dilution theory, the emerging 
importance of advertising appears at the genesis of the commercial speech 
doctrine.  Compare Klieger supra note 24, at 807 with infra note 115 and 
accompanying text. 
 114. See DENISE M. TRAUTH & JOHN L. HUFFMAN, The Commercial Speech 
Doctrine: Posadas Revisionism, in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 99, 
99 (Honorable Theodore R. Kupferman, ed., 1990). 
 115. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).  The Chrestensen 
Court dealt with § 318 of the New York Sanitary Code, “which forbids 
distribution of commercial and business advertising matter,” but does not 
forbid distribution of material devoted solely to “information or a public 
protest.”  Id. at 53.  Chrestensen distributed a double-sided handbill: one side 
was devoted solely to commercial advertising, while the other was devoted to 
“protest against the action of the City Dock Department . . . but no commercial 
advertising.”  Id.  In a remarkably short opinion, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the city ordinance did not violate the Constitution and apparently left no 
room for argument: 
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places 
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and 
disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities 
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they 
may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public 
thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no 
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising. 
Id. at 54 (emphasis added). 
However, the commercial speech doctrine was comprehensively re-examined 
in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).  The issue faced by the Bigelow 
Court was a newspaper’s right to carry paid advertising that encouraged or 
prompted procuring an abortion.  Id. at 809.  The defendant was convicted of 
violating a Virginia statute that read: “If any person, by publication, lecture, 
advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, . . . or in any 
other manner, encourage or promote the processing of abortion or 
miscarriage, . . . he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”  Id. at 813 n.3 (citing 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1972)).  The Supreme Court established that “speech 
is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in 
[the form of a paid commercial advertisement].”  Id. at 818.  Bigelow was 
particularly important because, in addition to granting constitutional 
protection for some forms of commercial speech, it established that protection 
was justified because the public had a need for the information contained in 
the advertisement.  TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 100. 
 116. See 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  The Virginia statute at issue, section 54-
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commercial speech doctrine117 and essentially stands for the 
proposition that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction’” is entitled to some First Amendment 
protection.118  However, the Court’s application of Virginia 
Pharmacy has been inconsistent119 and the doctrine has been 
labeled “a notoriously unstable and contentious domain of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”120 

524.35 Va. Code Ann. (1974), stated that “a pharmacist licensed in Virginia is 
guilty of unprofessional conduct if he ‘(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, . . . 
any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms . . . for any 
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.’”  Id. at 749-50.  The 
Virginia Pharmacy Court held that “speech which does ‘no more than propose 
a commercial transaction’” may be of general public interest.  Id. at 762, 764.  
The court noted that the “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”  Id. at 763.  As a result, “the 
free flow of commercial information is indispensable” to a free enterprise 
economy because that information is used to make intelligent, well-informed 
decisions.  Id. at 765.  This reasoning parallels the traditional concept of First 
Amendment protection for expression: participants in a democratic self-
governing political process must have guaranteed freedom of public discussion 
in order to make well-informed political decisions.  Alexander Meiklejohn, 
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26-28 
(1960). 
 117. See Post, supra note 21, at 2 (citing Virginia Pharmacy). 
 118. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (remarking that commercial 
speech does not lack all First Amendment protection); see generally TRAUTH & 
HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 101-03. 
 119. See David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial 
Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 383 (1990) (arguing that the court has treated 
very loosely the language defining commercial speech and contrasting Virginia 
Pharmacy with Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980)). 
 120. Post, supra note 21, at 2.  One reason for this inconsistency might be 
that the lack of full First Amendment protection is based on “‘commonsense’ 
differences between commercial speech and other varieties.”  Bates v. State 
Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).  These common sense differences, 
“unarticulated almost by definition, subsequently have supported a great 
many restrictions of commercial speech”.  McGowan, supra note 119, at 369 
(quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 380-81). The Bates Court relied on Virginia 
Pharmacy to find that commercial speech, although protected, was not given 
absolute protection.  McGowan, supra note 119, at 369; cf. TRAUTH & 
HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 104 (observing that “when advertising fulfills 
the informational needs of consumers it serves an ‘indispensable’ role” and 
thus implying the existence of circumstances where advertising does not fulfill 
the informational needs of consumers). 
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978), the court articulated a 
First Amendment value hierarchy explaining that commercial speech was less 
deserving of protection than non-commercial speech.  Ohralik, a lawyer, was 
described as an “ambulance chase[r].”  Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
The Court upheld Ohio’s regulation against in-person solicitation by lawyers 
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The inconsistent Supreme Court decisions prompted121 an 
extensive re-examination of the commercial speech doctrine in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission.122  The Court re-examined the First Amendment 

by adopting a “leveling rationale.”  McGowan, supra note 119, at 370.  The 
Court reaoned as follows: 
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling 
process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the 
latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to 
such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a 
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate 
position in the scale of First Amendment value. . . . 
Ohralik at 456.  This theory has garnered sympathy from other commentators.  
McGowan, supra note 119, at 370 n.67 (citing Frederick Schauer, Commercial 
Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 
1182 n.8 (1988)).  McGowan contends that the leveling rationale was used to 
“justify extending a lesser degree of first amendment protection for 
commercial speech than the court gave speech it believed was at the core of 
the first amendment.”  McGowan, supra note 119, at 370.  McGowan 
concludes: “the Court’s indiscriminate use of the leveling rationale allowed it 
to avoid the more difficult problem of justifying its treatment of commercial 
speech by reference to first amendment theory.”  Id. at 371. 
 121. See e.g., McGowan, supra note 119, at 371.  McGowan correctly 
contends that the Ohralik Court “failed to incorporate into its analysis the 
distinction between speech and conduct that entails speech.”  Id.  This is based 
on McGowan’s analysis of the economic due process argument.  See id., at 439-
441 (critiquing Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979)).  Essentially, the 
hypothesis is that commercial speech is not speech for First Amendment 
purposes; rather it is merely another form of economic activity.  Id.  This 
argument works “only if advertisements constituting verbal acts are conflated 
with the balance of commercial speech.”  Id. at 440.  But a court, striking down 
economic regulations with which it disagrees, would be “using the first 
amendment as a pretext for implementing its economic policies.”  Id.  
McGowan properly concludes that the economic due process argument fails 
because it would be valid only for “advertisements that actually constitute 
offers—using language that in and of itself creates a commercial obligation.”  
Id. at 440-41.  Thus, that the Ohralik Court’s failure to distinguish between 
speech and conduct that entails speech allowed it to “avoid the more difficult 
problem of justifying its treatment of commercial speech by reference to first 
amendment theory.”  Id. at 371. 
 122. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  In Central Hudson, the Public Service 
Commission of New York responded to a fuel shortage with a ban of all 
advertising that promoted electricity use.  Id. at 558-59.  After the shortage 
was over the Commission extended the ban, reasoning that “all promotional 
advertising [was] contrary to the national policy of conserving energy.”  Id. at 
559.  However, the Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informational” 
advertising designed to encourage “‘shifts of consumption’ from peak demand 
times to periods of low electricity demand.”  Id. at 560.  The trial court upheld 
the Commission’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding 
that “the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited 
constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue.”  Id. at 560-61.  The 
 308 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 4:285 
 
basis for protecting commercial speech and concluded that 
protection must “turn[] on the nature both of the expression 
and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”123  
The Court further stated that, in certain circumstances, the 
government may proscribe some forms of communication.124  In 
doing so, the Court articulated a four-part test to determine 
whether commercial speech is protected by the First 
Amendment.125  Finally, the Court defined commercial speech 
as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker”126 and alternately characterized commercial speech as 
that which “propose[s] a commercial transaction.”127  Thus, the 
Supreme Court had finally provided a workable method for 
determining what commercial speech was and how to tell 

Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and struck down the provision as 
overbroad in relation to the asserted state interests.  Id. at 570-72. 
 123. Id. at 563. 
 124. The Central Hudson Court outlined its reasoning: 
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising.  Consequently, there can be no 
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages 
that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The 
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive 
the public than to inform it or commercial speech related to illegal 
activity. 
Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
 125. Id. at 566.  The test was stated follows: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected 
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest 
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest. 
Id.  McGowan explains that this test was significant because “the test [implied 
an admission by the Court] that states could regulate even some truthful 
commercial speech.”  McGowan, supra note 119, at 372.  Also, note here that 
the Central Hudson test remains valid today.  See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) (stating “[a]lthough several Members of 
the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and 
whether it should apply in particular cases . . . there is no need in this case to 
break new ground”) (internal citations omitted). 
 126. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 (stating “[t]he Commission’s order 
restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience”). 
 127. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56); Contra McGowan, 
supra note 119, at 371.  McGowan contends that the Central Hudson Court 
“failed to define what it meant by commercial speech, referring to such speech 
alternatively as” expression of the speaker’s economic interests and speech 
proposing a commercial transaction.  Id. 
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whether it was protected or not.128  Central Hudson stands as 
the authoritative commercial speech case and the Court’s 
pronouncement that “the First Amendment’s concern for 
commercial speech is based on the informational function of 
advertising” is still cited as settled law.129 
Unfortunately, commentators have long argued that the 
Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine is incoherent.130  
This argument has been renewed by recent opinions handed 
down within ten years of each other.131  In 1996132 a 
“fragmented” and highly “libertarian” Supreme Court in 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 133 debated the continuation of 
Central Hudson’s validity and struck down a state prohibition 
against advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages.134  
The Court based its decision on a “strong skepticism toward 
state regulation of advertising as a device for preventing 
consumers from knowing about a product in order to induce 
them not to buy it – the very rationale that had easily 
sustained the regulation in [Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. 
Tourism Co.]” ten years earlier.135  However, the 44 Liquormart 
decision was arguably inconsistent with past commercial 
speech cases.136  In fact, “before the [1996] Term, advocates and 

 128. See TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 107. 
 129. Post, supra note 21, at 14 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563); 
see e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 426 (2001). 
 130. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 119, at 360. 
 131. See Post, supra note 21 at 3.  Post argues that the Court’s opinion in 
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), “was so 
solicitous of government restrictions as to suggest . . . that commercial speech 
doctrine was ‘left for dead.’”  Id. at 3.  Post contrasts Posadas with the Court’s 
opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).  Post 
contends that the 44 Liquormart opinion was “so protective [of all speech] as 
to render it unclear why commercial speech should continue to be treated as a 
separate category of speech.”  Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
Sullivan, supra note 8). 
 132. Note here that the FTDA was passed in both houses by December 
1995, before the 44 Liquormart decision was handed down on May 13, 1996.  
Compare H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 1 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029 with 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484. 
 133. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 484. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 126.  Sullivan noted that “[the Supreme 
Court] likewise found the state’s goal (less bibulous Rhode Islanders) 
inadequately met by means that should have seemed sensible, not silly, by the 
lights of previous decisions.”  Id.  Sullivan concluded that “[44] Liquormart is 
thus the Court’s most libertarian decision on commercial speech since Virginia 
[Pharmacy].”  Id. 
 136. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 140 (contending that “by the logic of 
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opponents of robust protection for commercial speech each 
could claim some measure of victory.”137  The most important 
aspect of 44 Liquormart was the Court’s argument about the 
appropriate standard of scrutiny commercial speech deserved – 
if it deserved its own standard at all.138  It is quite clear from 
the divergent opinions that the Court had no clear explanation 
why commercial speech should or should not “continue to be 
treated as a separate category of speech isolated from general 
First Amendment principles.”139 
A doctrinal middle position between these two extremes 
exists: the Supreme Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products 
Corp.140 found that 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2)141 violated the First 
Amendment rights of the advertiser and manufacturer of 
Trojan brand condoms.142  The Bolger Court explained that, “the 
First Amendment means that [the] government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”143  The Court qualified this 
sweeping statement by observing that “[b]y contrast, regulation 
of commercial speech based on content is less problematic” 

Central Hudson, Posadas, and [United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 
U.S. 418 (1993)], 44 Liquormart should have been an easy case the other 
way”). 
 137. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 125.  In part, the Court’s reversal of Posadas 
and re-alignment with Virginia Pharmacy has been attributed to the 1994 
retirement of Justice Blackmun.  Sullivan, supra note 8, at 146 & n.84. 
 138. See generally Sullivan, supra note 8, Section III.  Sullivan argues that 
it is “unclear whether [Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg] 
would apply strict scrutiny to all laws aimed at the content of a commercial 
advertisement, or only to those that are paternalistic.”  Id. at 146.  Yet even 
Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Ginsburg would “withhold strict scrutiny 
‘when a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from 
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices’ . . . – in which case they 
would apply ‘less than strict review’ even though such regulations would 
ordinarily be considered content-based.”  Id. (citing 44 Liquormart).  Sullivan 
observes that “this little-noticed dictum” departed from conventional 
commercial speech doctrine in that it advocated “less than strict review” for 
fraudulent or misleading commercial speech.  Id.  Sullivan astutely contends 
that under these circumstances, “[a]ny review, even if ‘less than strict review,’ 
is thus a novelty.”  Id.  In sum, the court’s position on the protection afforded 
to commercial speech was agressively expansive compared to the Posadas 
Court.  See supra note 131. 
 139. Sullivan, supra note 8, at 126. 
 140. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 141. Id. at 61 (“[p]rohibit[ing] the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for 
contraceptives”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 65 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 
(1972)). 
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because of the problems of deception, confusion, and potential 
consumer fraud.144  Although the court eventually found that 
the speech at stake was protected commercial speech, it is 
hardly surprising given that the advertising related to 
contraception.145  The Bolger Court seemed to have made a 
decision that the non-commercial value of the speech 
substantially outweighed any commercial value.  Yet because 
that non-commercial speech was clearly related to standard 
commercial speech, it characterized the whole as a type of 
protected commercial speech.146 

 144. 463 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added). The Bolger Court then analyzed the 
speech to determine whether it was commercial or non-commercial, stating 
that the degree of protection rests on correct classification as such.  Id.  The 
Court noted that most of Bolger’s mailings fell within the “core notion of 
commercial speech – speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.’”  Id. at 66 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).  The 
Bolger Court stated that: 
The mailings constitute commercial speech notwithstanding the fact 
that they contain discussions of important public issues such as 
venereal disease and family planning.  We have made clear that 
advertising which “links a product to current public debate” is not 
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded to 
noncommercial speech. . . . We conclude, therefore, that all of the 
mailings in this case are entitled to the qualified but nonetheless 
substantial protection accorded to commercial speech. 
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67-68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
What is interesting about this opinion is that the Court, in its discussion of 
whether to protect the speech, notes that advertising for contraceptives 
“implicates ‘substantial individual and societal interests’” in the free flow of 
commercial information [and] also relates to activity which is protected from 
unwarranted state interference.  Id. at 69 (emphasis added) (citing Carey v. 
Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-701 (1977)).  Essentially the Bolger 
Court is protecting this commercial speech because its content strongly relates 
to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69.  
This content-specific analysis assumes that the public needs protection from 
misleading speech because it “lacks sophistication.”  See Post, supra note 21, 
at 40.  Post’s compelling insight here is that “Central Hudson’s use of the 
misleading requirement as a threshold precondition for First Amendment 
protection cannot, without internal contradiction, be premised upon the 
content of speech.”  Id. at 41 (emphasis added).  Post suggests that “[t]he 
contradiction can be resolved only by . . . focus[ing] on the specific conditions 
that might be understood to render consumers dependent and vulnerable.”  Id. 
 145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (noting that the type of speech at issue is 
“entitled to the qualified but nonetheless substantial protection accorded to 
commercial speech”).  Justice Stevens, concurring with the Bolger Court, 
disagreed on the grounds that the distinction between non-commercial and 
commercial speech involved compromise.  Cf. id. at 82-83.  Justice Stevens 
wrote that instead, “it may be more fruitful to focus on the nature of the 
challenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communication.  Id. 
at 82-83 (emphasis added).  Justice Stevens focused on the purpose behind the 
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Most recently, the Court in Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center 147 reaffirmed that commercial speech enjoys a 
“qualified but nonetheless substantial protection.”148  The 
Thompson Court emphasized that “even a communication that 
does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled 
to coverage of the First Amendment,”149 but qualified this 
assertion by reaffirming the Virginia Pharmacy Court’s holding 
that “not all regulation of [commercial] speech is 
unconstitutional.”150  The Thompson Court agreed that some 
types of commercial speech may still be regulated if it concerns 
unlawful or misleading activity.151  This seemed to affirm a 
middle position between Posadas and 44 Liquormart, a position 
that nevertheless offers some types of commercial speech less 
than full First Amendment protection.  Furthermore, this 
position seems to be consistent with the 44 Liquormart Court’s 
general lack of comfort in fully protecting misleading speech or 
speech that the government has a strong interest in 
restricting.152  Thompson is most important for its recognition 
that Central Hudson remains a valuable part of the 
Commercial Speech doctrine, and that regulation of commercial 
speech can be constitutional. 
The amount of protection afforded to commercial speech 
compared to noncommercial speech is unclear.  However, it is 
clear that commercial speech may be constitutionally 

message, and argued that “[i]t matters whether a law regulates 
communications for their ideas or for their style.”  Id. at 84.  Justice Stevens 
concluded that “regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally 
appropriate balance between the advocate’s right to convey a message and the 
recipient’s interest in the quality of his environment.”  Id. at 84.  This 
statement was echoed by his position in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), 
that “bars against ‘dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial 
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining 
process’ should receive strict scrutiny” while “regulations whose purpose is ‘to 
protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales 
practices’ . . . should receive ‘less than strict’ scrutiny.”  Sullivan, supra note 8, 
at 142. 
 147. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 148. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 n.7. 
 149. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
767 (1993)). 
 150. Thompson, at 367.  The Court found that the regulations at issue were 
unconstitutional because, applying Central Hudson, the proposed restrictions 
were overly broad.  Id. at 376-77. 
 151. See id. at 367. 
 152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (explaining the positions of 
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg). 
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regulated. The ability to impose such regulation may arguably 
depend on the nature of the regulation, rather than just the 
content of the speech. 
II. THE MATTEL DECISION 
The legal battle began on September 11, 1997, when 
Mattel, Inc. filed suit against MCA Records, Inc. in a California 
Federal District Court.153  This case involved Mattel in its 
capacity as owner of the Barbie trademark, and MCA in its 
capacity as producer, marketer, and seller of Barbie Girl, a 
song by the Danish band “Aqua.”154  What makes this case so 
immediately appealing is the fact that Barbie is more than a 
blonde doll with a diverse wardrobe; she is a cultural icon.155 
In March 1997, Aqua released its album, Aquarium, in 
Europe.156  The eleven-song album included the song Barbie 
Girl, in which band members assume the identity of Barbie and 
her boyfriend Ken.157  In Barbie Girl, the band members sing 
about Barbie’s “[l]ife in plastic,” and state that Barbie is “a 
blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world.”158  Clearly, the song is 

 153. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1407 (C.D.Cal. 
1998) (order denying preliminary injunction) (hereinafter Mattel Order). 
 154. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d. 894, 898-99 (2002). 
 155. See id. at 898.  Judge Kozinski delved into the history of Barbie to 
provide this memorable account: 
Barbie was born in Germany in the 1950s as an adult collector’s item. 
Over the years, Mattel transformed her from a doll that resembled a 
“German street walker,” as she originally appeared, into a glamorous, 
long-legged blonde. Barbie has been labeled both the ideal American 
woman and a bimbo. She has survived attacks both psychic (from 
feminists critical of her fictitious figure) and physical (more than 500 
professional makeovers). She remains a symbol of American girlhood, 
a public figure who graces the aisles of toy stores throughout the 
country and beyond. With Barbie, Mattel created not just a toy but a 
cultural icon. 
Id. (citing M.G. LORD, FOREVER BARBIE: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF A 
REAL DOLL 32 (1994)).  Judge Kozinski is known for sensitivity to the cultural 
significance of parties appearing in his courtroom.  See, e.g., White v. Samsung 
Elec. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1408 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging that “[f]or better or worse, we are the Court of 
Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit”). 
 156. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 909.  The entire lyrics for Barbie Girl by Aqua 
are as follows: 
 -Hiya Barbie! 
 -Hi Ken! 
 -You wanna go for a ride? 
 314 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 4:285 
 
commenting on a stereotyped Barbie life.  The song was 
released in the United States, and by September 1997, Aqua 
was on its way to notoriety and fame: Aquarium, sold over 1.4 
million copies in the United States alone.159  Eventually, “to 
Mattel’s dismay” Barbie Girl made it to the Top 40.160 
Mattel brought suit, alleging eleven causes of action, 
including federal and state trademark dilution claims.161  

 -Sure, Ken! 
 -Jump in! 
 -Ha ha ha ha! 
 (CHORUS:) 
 I’m a Barbie girl, in my Barbie world 
 Life in plastic, it’s fantastic 
 You can brush my hair, undress me everywhere 
 Imagination, life is your creation 
 Come on Barbie, let’s go party! 
 (CHORUS) 
 I’m a blonde bimbo girl, in a fantasy world 
 Dress me up, make it tight, I’m your dolly 
 You’re my doll, rock and roll, feel the glamour in pink 
 Kiss me here, touch me there, hanky-panky 
 You can touch, you can play 
 If you say “I’m always yours,” ooh ooh 
 (CHORUS) 
 (BRIDGE:) 
 Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ah ah ah yeah 
 Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh 
 Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ah ah ah yeah 
 Come on, Barbie, let’s go party, ooh ooh, ooh ooh 
 Make me walk, make me talk, do whatever you please 
 I can act like a star, I can beg on my knees 
 Come jump in, be my friend, let us do it again 
 Hit the town, fool around, let’s go party 
 You can touch, you can play 
 You can say “I’m always yours” 
 You can touch, you can play 
 You can say “I’m always yours” 
 (BRIDGE) 
 (CHORUS x2) 
 (BRIDGE) 
 -Oh, I’m having so much fun! 
 -Well, Barbie, we’re just getting started! 
 -Oh, I love you Ken! 
Id. 
 159. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408. 
 160. Mattel, 296 F.3d. at 899. 
 161. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408.  Specifically, Mattel alleged 
federal dilution claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1123(c)(1) (Supp. 1997) (owner of a 
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Interestingly, Mattel did not sue Aqua or the band members 
individually, claiming that it was “not attempting to ‘censor’ 
the song, . . . [just] the companies that actually manufactured 
and distributed the CD.”162  Mattel took the position that Barbie 
was “associated with wholesomeness” and that MCA’s song was 
“antisocial . . . [because] Barbie Girl supports ‘promiscuity, 
lewdness, and the stereotyping and denigration of young 
women.’”163  Mattel claimed the Barbie Girl portrayal tarnished 
the Barbie trademark164 and attempted to draw similarities 
between the Barbie Girl lyrics and other sexually explicit 
parodies including a pornographic Dallas Cowboy cheerleader 
movie and a sexually explicit Pillsbury doughpersons cartoon.165 
At trial, MCA defended the federal dilution claims 
primarily on the grounds that its speech was protected under 
the “noncommercial use of a mark” exception to the FTDA.166  
The trial court agreed, noting: “mere association of a trademark 
with ‘unwholesome or negative context’ is [not] enough to make 
a trademark dilution claim.”167  In addition, the trial court 
cautiously explained that, “applying the trademark dilution law 
to parodies . . . raises important First Amendment questions.”168  
The trial court claimed that it “must be wary” of applying the 
dilution statute, otherwise it would permit mark holders to 

famous mark entitled to injunctive relief), and state dilution claims under 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §14330 (1997) (likelihood of injury is grounds for 
injunctive relief, not withstanding absence of competition).  Mattel Order, 46 
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1419 (emphasis added). 
 162. 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1408 n.1. 
 163. Id. at 1419 (quoting Pl.’s Prelim. Inj. Mot. at 25). 
 164. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1155 
(1998) (hereinafter Mattel Trial).  However, the trial court noted that Mattel 
itself had been accused of “promoting unrealistic, sexist stereotypes of what 
constitutes the ‘ideal woman’” and that a book copyrighted by Mattel had 
included several less than wholesome descriptions of Barbie along with 
acknowledgments of Barbie’s unrealistic body proportions.  Id. 
 165. See Mattel Order, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1419 (citing Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.1979) 
(holding defendant liable for using cheerleader uniform in X-rated film) and 
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 136 (N.D.Ga. 
1981) (holding defendant liable under State anti-dilution statute for 
publishing cartoon of “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” doughpersons 
engaging in sexual intercourse and fellatio)). 
 166. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1155; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) 
(2000). 
 167. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (relying in general on the court’s 
analysis in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 
1987)). 
 168. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
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obtain dilution injunctions “simply because they find such 
parodies ‘negative or offensive.’”169  The trial court attempted to 
distinguish between Balducci Publications170 and L.L. Bean.171  
The defendant in Balducci Publications attacked the plaintiff, 
Anheuser-Busch, in a way “not even remotely necessary to 
Balducci’s goals of commenting on [a specific] oil spill [in a 
water supply source used by the plaintiff].”172  However, in L.L. 
Bean and the Mattel case, both defendants used plaintiffs 
trademark because it was “necessary for the purposes of 
parody.”173  As a result, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for MCA on Mattel’s dilution claim174 and rested its 
analysis on the noncommercial use exception simply to avoid 
the obvious constitutional question.175 
Mattel appealed the decision, arguing that Barbie Girl 
diluted Mattel’s mark in two ways: “[i]t diminishes the mark’s 
capacity to identify and distinguish Mattel products, and 
tarnishes the mark because the song is inappropriate for young 
girls.”176  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the FTDA paid homage 
to Schechter’s contribution177 and also noted the distinction 
between an ordinary trademark injunction (requiring a 
likelihood of confusion) and a dilution injunction (requiring no 
such showing).178  This distinction accords with the Allied 

 169. Id. (quoting L.L. Bean Inc., 811 F.2d at 33). 
 170. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 171. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 
1987). 
 172. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 n.56 (quoting Balducci Publ’ns, 28 
F.3d at 778) (alteration in original). 
 173. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 n.56; accord, Pearson, supra note 
40, at 1007 (explaining that “[a] parody must make its viewer realize what it is 
poking fun at” and asserting that “[f]or a parody to conjure the image of the 
subject mark . . . it will have to bear substantial similarity to it”).  See 
generally GINSBURG, supra note 44, at 874-915 (presenting various parody 
cases). 
 174. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 
 175. See generally, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & 
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 873-89 (3d. ed. 2001) (discussing Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (interpreting 
the National Labor Relations Act and its definition of “employer”) and the 
canon that courts should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional problems).  
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY examines how this canon has been abused in the 
commercial speech context in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).  ESKRIDGE & 
FRICKEY at 884-85. 
 176. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902-03. 
 177. Id. at 903. 
 178. See id. 
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Maintenance court’s precipitous decision.179  The Mattel court 
adopted Judge Leval’s “lucid and scholarly” analysis180 of the 
statutory terms in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.181  The 
Nabisco court explained that the FTDA established five 
necessary elements for a dilution claim.182  The Mattel court, 
following Nabisco, concluded that, “Barbie easily qualifies 
under the FTDA as a famous and distinctive mark.”183  The 
Mattel court also asserted that Barbie Girl constituted a 
“commercial use in commerce”184 because MCA “created and 
sold to consumers in the marketplace commercial products . . . 
[bearing] the Barbie mark.”185  The court then announced, 
without fanfare, that MCA’s use was dilutitive because, when 
some consumers hear Barbie’s name, they will think of both the 
doll and the song.186  “To be dilutitive, use of the mark need not 
bring to mind the junior user alone,” because the mark is 
diluted “if [it] no longer brings to mind the senior user alone.”187  

 179. See id; see supra note 44, and note 51 and accompanying text 
(distinguishing between trademark infringement and trademark dilution and 
their importance in the history of trademark dilution theory). 
 180. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. 
 181. 191 F.3d 208, 214-17 (2d  Cir. 1999). 
 182. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.  The court stated that “(1) the senior 
mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a 
commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has 
become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
senior mark.”  Id.  The Nabisco court did not examine the “commercial use in 
commerce” requirement, stating that “it [is not] disputed that Nabisco’s sale of 
its goldfish cracker would involve a commercial use in commerce.”  Id. 
(internal quotes omitted). 
 183. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. 
 184. The court defined “commercial use in commerce” as “a use of a famous 
and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those produced or authorized by 
the mark’s owner.”  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1998)).  In Panavision, Toeppen 
registered the internet domain name “panavision.com” along with the domain 
names of other large corporations.  Id. at 1319.  When Panavision 
International, L.P. attempted to register its own name, Toeppen attempted to 
sell the domain name to Panavision.  Id.  The defendant argued that his use of 
“Panavision” was not commercial, but the court disagreed noting that 
“Toeppen traded on the value of Panavision’s mark.”  Panavision, 141 F.3d 
1318, 1325.  MCA’s actions were distinct from Toeppen’s.  The Mattel court did 
not find that MCA traded on the value of the Barbie mark to sell records.  
Instead, MCA sold records that contained songs about, among other things, 
Barbie’s materially plastic fantasy world.  Simply put, MCA’s purpose behind 
its use of the Barbie mark was only weakly commercial. 
 185. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. 
 186. See id. at 904. 
 187. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The court noted that this was an example of a “classic blurring 
injury and is in no way diminished by the fact that the song 
itself refers back to Barbie the doll.”188  The court declined to 
decide whether Barbie Girl tarnished Mattel’s mark.189 
The Ninth Circuit then considered the statutory 
exemptions listed in the FTDA and their applicability to MCA’s 
actions.190  As the court noted, the “comparative advertising” 
and “news reporting and commentary” exemptions simply did 
not apply to the facts here.191  However, the noncommercial use 
exemption posed a tougher question.192  The court remarked 
that defining the term “commercial use” to be the same 
whether determining a “commercial use in commerce” or a 
“noncommercial use” creates a constitutional problem “because 
it would leave the FTDA with no First Amendment protection 
for dilutitive speech other than comparative advertising and 
news reporting.”193 
The lack of First Amendment protection troubled the Ninth 
Circuit because it viewed the FTDA as lacking two significant 
limitations to reduce the tension between traditional 
trademark infringement actions and First Amendment rights.  
First, the court argued simplistically that dilution injunctions 
apply across a broader range of industries than trademark 
injunctions.194  Second, the court argued that trademark 

 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 904, n.5 (remarking that “[b]ecause we find blurring, we 
need not consider whether the song also tarnished the Barbie mark”) 
(emphasis added).  This is crucial because, as explained in Part III, use of the 
Barbie mark in the title results in dilutitive blurring with relatively little First 
Amendment tension compared to an expressive use of the Barbie mark and its 
resulting dilutitive tarnishment injury. 
 190. See id. at 904. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See id.  According to the Mattel court, the statutory language is 
somewhat contradictory.  If dilution can only occur by commercial use, how 
can such use also be noncommercial and earn an exemption under 15 U.S.C. 
1125(c)(4)(B)?  The court pointed out that “[i]f the term ‘commercial use’ had 
the same meaning in both provisions, this would eliminate one of the three 
statutory exemptions defined by this subsection, because any use found to be 
dilutitive would, of necessity, not be noncommercial.”  Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id.  The court argued that that trademark infringement provides 
limited relief–only where the junior use is likely to confuse.  Id.  The court 
contrasted this with dilution injunctions, which are not limited to competing 
industries, and therefore “sweep across broad vistas of the economy.”  Id. at 
905.  However, the court failed to acknowledge that with the increase in broad 
brand label appeal, trademark infringement actions may also reach broadly 
into unrelated goods and services.  See e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA 
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injunctions are premised “on the need to prevent consumer 
confusion,” consistent with the First Amendment protection 
principles.195  However, the court then argued that, “dilution 
law protects only the distinctiveness of the mark, which is 
inherently less weighty than the dual interest of protecting 
trademark owners and avoiding harm to consumers that is at 
the heart of every trademark claim.”196  The Ninth Circuit then 
suggested that in order to reconcile this tension, 
noncommercial speech must be defined in such a way that it 
can be covered by the noncommercial use exemption and, at the 
same time, constitute a commercial use in commerce.197  The 
court cited the FTDA’s legislative history as “suggest[ing] an 
interpretation . . . that both solves our interpretive dilemma 
and diminishes some First Amendment concerns.”198  The Ninth 
Circuit defined noncommercial use as “a use that consists 

Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 667 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding trademark 
infringement claims by clothing manufacturer against magazine of the same 
name).  In Westchester Media, the Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district 
court, noted that the New POLO magazine could be perceived as being within 
PRL’s “natural zone of expansion.”  Id. at 666. 
However, this is based on the weak concept that “[i]f consumers believe, even 
though falsely, that the natural tendency of producers of the type of goods 
marketed by the prior user is to expand into the market for the type of goods 
marketed by the subsequent user, confusion may be likely.”  Id. (quoting Elvis 
Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 202 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 21 cmt. j (1995))). But brand 
identities increasingly encompass a broad spectrum of lifestyle activities.  For 
example, if Ford Motor Co. started marketing Winchester Edition Ford 
Explorers (the Ford Explorer is a popular midsize SUV, and Winchester 
markets popular sporting rifles and shotguns), complete with special edition 
shotgun, custom installed gun racks and bandolier style seat belts, would a 
consumer be reasonably justified in believing that Ford’s natural zone of 
expansion is gun manufacture?  Yet with the broadening appeal and lifestyle 
image of rugged/outdoors/sporting brands such as Ford and Winchester, the 
“natural zone of expansion” grows ever widening.  See The Int’l Owners Club 
for the Range Rover Marque, Range Rover Holland & Holland, at 
http://www.rrr.co.uk/series_ii/holland.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2003) 
(describing a British luxury truck built and outfitted in collaboration with a 
British luxury gun manufacturer).  Thus, a trademark infringement injunction 
also has the possibility of “sweeping across broad vistas of the economy.”  
Contra Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904-905. 
 195. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905.  The court properly noted that the First 
Amendment does not protect commercial fraud.  Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).  “Moreover, 
avoiding harm to consumers is an important interest that is independent of 
the senior user’s interest in protecting its business.”  Id. 
 196. Mattel, 296 F.3d at. 905. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. 
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entirely of noncommercial, or fully constitutionally protected, 
speech.”199  The court’s special attention to the fact that the 
noncommercial use exemption applied only to entirely 
noncommercial speech is important because it was this gray 
area, in which noncommercial expression co-mingles with 
commercial speech, that the Mattel court interpreted. 
The Mattel court then examined the legislative history 
behind the FTDA and properly determined that Congress was 
aware of this issue and had dealt with the First Amendment 
problem.200  The court noted, in particular, House Judiciary 
Committee language stating that “[t]he bill will not prohibit or 
threaten ‘noncommercial’ expression, as that term has been 
defined by the courts.”201  In fact, the section-by-section analysis 
presented to the House and Senate was printed in the 
Congressional Record to clarify that the noncommercial use 
exemption was intended to relieve tension between the FTDA 

 199. Id. (emphasis added).  The court cited an older version of Jerome 
Gilson’s treatise, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, and emphasized 
Gilson’s definition that the noncommercial use exemption applies only to fully 
constitutionally protected speech, such as parodies.  See GILSON, supra note 
14, §5A.01[8][b]. 
 200. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905. 
 201. See id. (quoting 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031) (emphasis added).  
Clearly, the congressional understanding at the time the bill was debated was 
that judicial interpretation of commercial speech doctrine was distinct from 
noncommercial speech.  What is also interesting is that this explanation seems 
to acknowledge that the judicial definition could change.  This might imply 
that Congress assumed it was possible that in the future, even commercial 
speech could be fully protected by the First Amendment.  If this was true, then 
we must accept as true that Congress believed that the Act it was signing into 
law may become unconstitutional sometime in the future.  It is more likely 
that Congress was fixated on the concept that commercial transaction speech 
would always deserve relatively less First Amendment protection than 
“parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that are not a part of a 
commercial transaction.”  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 (citing 141 CONG. REC. 
S19306-10, S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orin Hatch); 
141 CONG. REC. H14317-01, H14318 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of 
Rep. Carlos Moorhead)).  This interpretation is even more likely given that the 
confusing 44 Liquormart decision (in which a fragmented Supreme Court 
argued, but did not decide, whether commercial speech was constitutionally 
distinct from noncommercial speech) was handed down after the FTDA 
became law.  See discussion on 44 Liquormart, supra notes 133-136 and 
accompanying text.  Most recently in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that commercial and 
noncommercial speech receive different levels of protection.  535 U.S. 357, 367 
(2002) (holding 5-4 that the regulation at issue was unconstitutional but the 
majority acknowledged that “not all regulation of [commercial] speech is 
unconstitutional”). 
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and First Amendment concerns.202 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit applied its understanding of the 
noncommercial use exemption to MCA Records’ distribution of 
Barbie Girl, which is a form of noncommercial expression.203  
The problem was that this court had previously identified the 
act of selling the Barbie Girl recording for profit as a form of 
commercial speech.204  Thus, the Mattel court had to find a way 
to treat speech that was both commercial and noncommercial 
at the same time. 
The Ninth Circuit relied on their recent decision in 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.205  In Hoffman, Los 
Angeles Magazine (LAM) published a photo spread containing 
digitally altered images from famous films.206  Dustin Hoffman’s 
appearance in a Tootsie still was altered so that “Hoffman’s 
body and his long-sleeved red sequined dress were replaced by 
the body of a male model in the same pose, wearing a [Richard 
Tyler] spaghetti-strapped, cream-colored, silk evening dress 
and [Ralph Lauren] high-heeled sandals.”207  Hoffman sued 
LAM’s parent company under the Lanham Act, alleging 
misappropriation of his name and likeness.208  The Hoffman 
court found that the magazine’s use was not purely commercial, 
and therefore deserved full First Amendment protection.209 
The Mattel court noted that the Hoffman decision relied on 
its interpretation of the purpose behind the magazine speech.210  
Since the Hoffman court found that there was a commercial 
purpose behind the magazine’s message of humor and fun, it 
concluded that where “commercial aspects are inextricably 

 202. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906. 
 203. See id. at 901 (stating “[Barbie Girl] pokes fun at Barbie and the 
values that Aqua contends she represents”). 
 204. See id. at 903.  See supra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.  
Interestingly, the court’s reasoning was that “commercial use in commerce” 
refers to “use of a famous and distinctive mark to sell goods other than those 
produced or authorized by the mark’s owner.”  Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903 (citing 
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1324-25).  However, as discussed supra in note 184, the 
court did not assert that MCA’s purpose was to sell products with the Barbie 
mark. 
 205. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 206. See id. at 1183. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. at 1185-86. 
 210. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906.  LAM clearly had a commercial purpose: 
“to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in which it appeared and to sell 
more copies.”  Id. (citing Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186) (quotes omitted). 
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entwined with expressive elements . . . they cannot be 
separated out from the fully protected whole.”211  The Mattel 
court adopted this reasoning and found that “Barbie Girl [is] 
not purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully 
protected.”212 
To sum up the Ninth Circuit’s argument: the Mattel court 
found that MCA’s use of Mattel’s mark had a commercial 
purpose and constituted dilution under the FTDA.  However, 
because the use was also a form of noncommercial expression, 
the noncommercial portion was exempt from the FTDA.  This 
noncommercial message deserved full First Amendment 
protection.213  Since the commercial aspect was “inextricably 
entwined” with the noncommercial message, the song deserved 
full First Amendment protection, and therefore MCA’s 
distribution of Barbie Girl was fully protected.  As noted in the 
introduction, there is no question that the result is correct: 
MCA should not be enjoined from distributing Barbie Girl.  
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning allows any protected 
expression that is “inextricably entwined” within commercial 
speech to claim exemption under the FTDA’s noncommercial 
use exemption. 
III.ANALYSIS AND IMPACT 
A. THE MATTEL COURT FAILED TO COMPLETELY ANALYZE 
MATTEL’S DILUTION CLAIM. 
The Mattel court’s failure to follow through completely in 
its analysis of the dilution issues caused the court to compare 

 211. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185 (internal quotes omitted).  The Hoffman 
court supported its reasoning by observing that “‘[t]here are common sense 
differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction and other varieties,’ and commonsense tells us this is not a simple 
advertisement.”  Id. at 1185-86 (quoting Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)).  The 
Hoffman court noted that if the altered image had appeared in a Ralph 
Lauren advertisement, then the speech might be purely commercial because 
“[s]uch use[] do[es] not implicate the First Amendment’s protection of 
expressions of editorial opinion.”  Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.  See, e.g., 
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (use of 
pitcher’s image in printed beer advertisement). 
 212. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906-07. 
 213. This is not to say that all noncommercial messages get absolute 
protection.  See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding defendant liable for 
commenting on cheerleader uniforms in X-rated film). 
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the commercial aspects of Mattel’s claim with noncommercial 
aspects of Barbie Girl.  Although this appears sound, this 
section will explain that the court should have recognized that 
the FTDA protects different types of dilution and, consequently, 
should have understood that blurring and tarnishment 
implicate different levels of First Amendment protection.  This 
section contends that the Mattel court should have considered 
both Mattel’s FTDA rights with respect to dilutitive blurring 
and dilutitive tarnishment, against MCA’s First Amendment 
rights.  As a result, the court should have found that Mattel’s 
dilutitive blurring injury was insignificant due to MCA’s 
relatively low commercial interest in the Barbie mark, and that 
MCA’s expressive rights heavily outweighed Mattel’s dilutitive 
tarnishment injury. 
1. FTDA protection. 
The first important realization is that the FTDA protects 
goodwill directly associated with the commercial value of 
trademarks because that value itself is worth protecting.214  The 
proposition that brand goodwill is economically valuable and 
monetarily measurable is not novel.215  Dilution protection is 
based on a recognition that economic parcelization of rights is 
more efficient as the number of economic participants and 
system complexity increases.216  Thus, trademarks have a 
property-like quality that is associated with the products and 
services marketed using that mark (i.e., the associated going 
concern). 
This realization is the result of economic changes in the 
national economy and reflects the age-old importance of 
investment protection.  The Industrial Revolution created an 
economic and industrial infrastructure efficient enough to allow 
mass production and cheap transportation of goods—goods that 
were distributed nationally and required trademarks to 

 214. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, ET.AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 562-63 (2d ed., 2000) (defining goodwill as “the 
economic value of consumers’ associations with a firm and its trademark”). 
 215. See id.  (noting that some estimates put the value of the Coca Cola 
trademark at $24 billion, while the Marlboro brand is estimated to be worth 
$65 billion); see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 
1999) (stating that “the stimulant effect of a distinctive and well-known mark 
is a powerful selling tool that deserves legal protection”) (internal quotes 
omitted).  See generally Muller, supra note 76, at 175. 
 216. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
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“convey[] important information about the products.”217  
Schechter recognized that trademarks derived their value from 
their ability to make products stand out in the sea of goods.218  
The mark could act as a “silent salesman that reaches over the 
shoulder of the retailer and across the latter’s counter, straight 
to the consumer.”219  The Allied Maintenance220 court recognized 
that trademarks should be protected based on their intrinsic 
value.221  Finally, Congress recognized that dilution directly 
affects the investment in the advertising value of a mark and 
attempted to incorporate this concept into the FTDA.222 
Protecting trademarks against dilution and treating them 
as valuable, property-like rights associated with a going 
concern is significant because it interstitially protects that 
which the traditional direct trademark infringement theory 
does not.223  This distinction is based on the notion, articulated 
by the Allied Maintenance court, that “relief may be difficult to 
secure in situations in which the parties are not in competition, 
nor produce similar products or perform similar services.”224  
The importance of this distinction relies on the recognition that 
the FTDA protects only famous and distinctive marks.225  As a 
result, there is an incentive to create and promote trademarks 
because of their perceived advertising power.226  At the same 
time, the interests of new mark holders seeking entry into the 
market are protected227 because the FTDA applies to only a 
limited number of “Supermarks.”228  Thus, the FTDA’s broad 

 217. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 854; see supra notes 31, 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Klieger, supra note 24, at 854. 
 220. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 
(N.Y. 1977). 
 221. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 224. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977); see supra note 50 and accompanying 
text. 
 225. See supra text accompanying note 61, and note 62 and accompanying 
text. 
 226. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text; cf. Klieger, supra note 
24, at 862 (contending that “[d]ilution law . . . encourages overinvestment in 
the cultivation of brand imagery”); Muller, supra note 76, at 175 (contending 
that “[i]nvestment in valuable trademark assets by mark holders is vital to 
encourage a healthy and robust economy”). 
 227. Contra Klieger, supra note 24, at 856. 
 228. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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protection229 is tempered by its limited applicability.  This is 
particularly important because it allows the FTDA to extend 
protection to marks that are commonly understood to have 
substantial economic value,230 even across completely unrelated 
industries.  Finally, the real and perceived constraint to society 
from dilution law’s anticompetitive effects231 is reduced, and 
that allows the FTDA to accommodate the valuable property-
like rights that inhere in trademarks.  This is not to suggest 
that trademarks should be protected in gross.  Rather, the 
FTDA simply recognizes the property-like value of trademarks 
associated with a going concern. 
2. Tarnishment is not Blurring. 
The second important realization is that the FTDA’s 
protection against dilution encompasses both tarnishment and 
blurring type injuries, and that these injuries are 
distinguishable in the manner in which they implicate the First 
Amendment.  Dilutitive blurring rarely implicates the First 
Amendment because the junior user’s use occurs through his 
commercially motivated desire to trade on the goodwill 
associated with the mark.232  The junior user is generally not 
using the mark as an expressive vehicle.233  For instance, in 
OBH,234 the junior user of “www.thebuffalonews.com” intended 
to momentarily mislead consumers into associating the 
“Buffalo News” mark with the defendant’s apartment search 
website.  Similarly, in Nabisco, the court held that Pepperidge 
Farm’s goldfish-shaped, cheese-flavored snack cracker was a 
distinct, valuable and protectable mark.235  Even if Nabisco’s 
similarly shaped and flavored cracker was produced with better 
quality and tastier ingredients, Pepperidge Farm would still be 
injured through dilutitive blurring because consumers would 
no longer immediately associate goldfish crackers with the 
Pepperidge Farm products; thus Pepperidge Farm’s mark 
would not bring to mind the senior user alone, and the 

 229. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 231. See generally Klieger, supra note 24, at 851-60. 
 232. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text. 
 233. Id. 
 234. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp.2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 
2000).  See supra text accompanying notes 94, 95. 
 235. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 226 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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associated property-like value would be decreased.236  Clearly, 
blurring impedes a senior mark holder’s ability to utilize the 
mark as marketing tool even in situations where the junior 
user may engender positive consumer response in the senior 
mark. 
In contrast, dilutitive tarnishment may implicate First 
Amendment concerns more often because the junior user’s 
comment on the mark may simultaneously dilute by creating 
negative associations in the consumer’s mind.237  For instance, 
in Am. Dairy Queen,238 the defendant’s use of “Dairy Queens” 
was explicitly void of any commentary about ADQ itself.239  The 
dilutitive tarnishment injury resulted entirely from the 
negative association between a potentially offensive film and 
ADQ’s wholesome image, and a dilution injunction would not 
infringe significantly on New Line’s expressive rights.240  
However, in comparison, if New Line’s use of “Dairy Queens” 
had been intended to poke fun at Midwestern pop culture, then 
clearly its tarnishing use directly implicates New Line’s First 
Amendment rights and a dilution injunction would clearly 
infringe on New Line’s expressive rights.  Similarly, the Fifth 
Circuit in Westchester Media241 recognized that the defendant 
magazine’s use of PRL USA’s “Polo” mark was both expressive 
and non-expressive.242  The court was able to balance these 
competing rights because the consumers in that case were 
“relatively sophisticated,” and magazine disclaimers would be 
effective in preserving the distinctiveness of PRL’s mark.243 
Complete analysis of the dilution injury was key to each 
court’s decision in Am. Dairy Queen, OBH, and Westchester 
Media.  In each of these cases, the junior use of the mark 
contained at least one instance of source identification for the 
junior user that was separable from expressive commentary 

 236. See supra text accompanying note 187.  Furthermore, Nabisco did not 
attempt to comment on the Pepperidge Farm’s mark.  This absolutely removes 
any First Amendment rights Nabisco may have had in using Pepperidge 
Farm’s goldfish cracker mark. 
 237. See supra notes 84-87, 98-102 and accompanying text. 
 238. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 
(D.Minn. 1998). 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
 241. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings., Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 
2000). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 107, 108. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 111, 112. 
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about the mark.244  Each court examined the non-expressive use 
and allotted sufficient protection to the mark holder in order to 
protect its valuable right to exclusivity.245 
The Mattel court did not provide an extensive analysis.  
The court stopped looking for dilutitive injury after 
determining that there was blurring.246  In the court’s view, 
MCA’s interest in commenting on Mattel’s mark was directly 
opposed to Mattel’s interest in protecting the property-like 
value associated with its Barbie mark.247  The court should have 
examined, analogously to the Nabisco court,248 the dilutitive 
blurring injury of Mattel’s trademark interests as affected by 
MCA’s purely commercial interest in profiting from the Barbie 
mark.249  Similarly, the court should have examined, 
analogously to the Am. Dairy Queen court,250 MCA’s expressive 
interest in relation to Mattel’s dilutitive tarnishment 
concerns.251  If the court had followed this analysis, it would 

 244. In Am. Dairy Queen, the defendant film company used “Dairy Queens” 
to identify its “mockumentary.”  See supra notes 88, 89 and accompanying 
text.  In OBH, the defendant website operator created initial interest 
confusion by using “www.thebuffalonews.com” to lead consumers to its 
website.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  In Westchester Media, the 
defendant magazine used “Polo” to identify its magazine.  See supra note 107 
and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 94, 95, 110 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d. 894, 904 n.5 (stating 
“[b]ecause we find blurring, we need not consider whether the song also 
tarnished the Barbie mark”). 
 247. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
 248. Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 249. Cf. id. at 218 (rejecting Nabisco’s argument that differences in 
packaging are sufficient to distinguish the products because of the court’s 
concern over post-sale confusion leading to actionable dilution).  The issue the 
court was grappling with here is that Nabisco’s crackers could eat up 
Pepperidge Farm’s market share even when served out of the box.  Therefore, 
Nabisco’s claim that packaging alone was sufficient to differentiate the 
products was ineffective.  Nabisco’s commercial interest was tied to the 
tangible reproduction of a goldfish-shaped cracker, not the marketing 
association with the CatDog show.  Id. (stating “[c]onsumers] will recognize a 
fish reminiscent of Pepperidge Farm’s fish”). 
 250. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 
(D.Minn. 1998). 
 251. Cf. id. at 734-35 (noting that the crucial distinction in New Line’s 
position was that it did not claim that any expressive message was contained 
in its title choice, and that if it had, the “balance between the public’s interest 
in free expression and its interest in avoiding . . . trademark dilution” could 
tilt in favor of free expression).  The court specifically noted that the injunction 
would only effect a “minute restriction on expression, but will do much to 
avoid . . . dilution.”  Id. at 735. 
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have found that Mattel’s dilutitive blurring injury was 
insignificant and tempered by MCA’s claimed lack of 
commercial intent to profit from its use of the Barbie mark.252  
Furthermore, the court would have found that Mattel’s 
tarnishment injury was relatively small in light of Barbie Girl’s 
significant expressive purpose.253 
In addition, the Mattel court failed to recognize that 
Hoffman,254 on which the Mattel court relied so heavily, 
extensively analyzed both the commercial and non-commercial 
aspects of Los Angeles Magazine’s use of Hoffman’s image.255  
The Hoffman court found that the defendant magazine’s use 
contained an express intention to attract attention and 
simultaneously comment on Hoffman.256  Thus, the defendant 
intentionally entwined its commercial and non-commercial 
speech.  In comparison, the Am. Dairy Queen court easily 
separated the commercial and non-commercial elements of New 
Line’s proposed title, “Dairy Queens,”257 because New Line’s 
intent was explicit.258  In contrast, the Mattel court found 
MCA’s use was primarily non-commercial expression, and only 
cursorily mentioned MCA’s commercial intent.259  The song was 

 252. Cf. Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (discussing statements about 
the original songwriter’s intentions).  The court noted that a certain minimum 
level of commercial interest is present in all writing.  Cf. id. at 1137 n.17 
(quoting Samuel Johnson’s observation that “[n]o man but a blockhead ever 
wrote, except for money”). 
 253. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 254. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 255. See id. at 1185-86 (analyzing the commercial and non-commercial 
aspects of the advertisement, and concluding that the magazine intentionally 
drew attention to itself while simultaneously commenting on Hoffman’s role in 
Tootsie); see also supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 256. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185-86. 
 257. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (holding that the 
speech was primarily non-commercial with a small commercial component). 
 258. The Am. Dairy Queen court reasoned that “the somewhat lesser 
protection afforded commercial speech” allowed the court to balance the 
“public’s interest in free expression and its interest in avoiding . . . trademark 
dilution.”  Id.  The Am. Dairy Queen court concluded that “[a]n injunction here 
will only effect a minute restriction on expression, but will do much to avoid 
confusion and dilution.”  Id. 
 259. Cf. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (stating “[t]he only indication that Mattel 
might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title”).  The only 
other mention of MCA’s commercial intentions occurs in the court’s holding: 
Hoffman controls: Barbie Girl is not purely commercial speech, and is 
therefore fully protected.  To be sure, MCA used Barbie’s name to sell 
copies of the song.  However, as we’ve already observed, see pp. 901-02 
supra, the song also lampoons the Barbie image and comments 
humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents.  Use 
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written and conceived with its expressive purpose as the 
primary motivation, and its commercial intent was of only 
minor importance.260  Thus, the Mattel court should not have 
treated MCA’s commercial and non-commercial speech as being 
“inextricably entwined.”261  Instead, the Mattel court should 
have considered MCA’s primary motivation – non-commercial 
commentary – and found that the commercial and non-
commercial elements were separable, just as they were in Am. 
Dairy Queen.262  Therefore, the Mattel court’s reliance on 
Hoffman was misplaced. 
Finally, if the Mattel court had conducted its FTDA 
analysis under the distinction between dilutitive blurring and 
dilutitive tarnishment, it would have had stronger grounds for 
denying Mattel’s demand for injunctive relief.263  Mattel’s FTDA 
claim would still have failed because, as the court correctly 
noted, MCA’s use of Mattel’s mark was primarily connected to 
the band’s commentary about the values it contends Barbie 
stands for.264  Further justification for the court’s analysis 
would be that Mattel did not try to alter the song’s lyrics, nor 
did Mattel seek injunctive relief against the band itself.265  Most 
importantly, the FTDA’s non-commercial use exemption266 was 
included to cover dilutitive tarnishment resulting from non-
commercial use of another’s mark.267  The legislative history 

of the Barbie mark in the song Barbie Girl therefore falls within the 
noncommercial use exemption to the FTDA. 
Id. at 906-07 (emphasis added). 
 260. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138; see also supra note 252. 
 261. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185) 
(emphasis added). 
 262. See supra notes 257, 258 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 252, 253. 
 264. See Mattel Trial, 28 F. Supp.2d at 1138 (quoting Soren Rasted, Barbie 
Girl’s primary writer as stating that he wanted “to compose a humorous song 
about the Barbie fantasy world”) (quotes and emphasis omitted).  He 
proceeded to describe the song as a “criminally funny sonic riff on the over-
endowed queen of pop culture.”  Id. at 1139 n.23. 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 162.  Even Mattel evidently 
realized that the song was an expressive work and seeking a dilution 
injunction against the band would be useless.  See id. 
 266. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 267. The non-commercial use exemption covers non-commercial use in 
commerce of another’s mark.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted 
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.  The relevant passage states that: 
The proposal adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment 
concerns espoused by the broadcasting industry and the media.  The 
bill will not prohibit or threaten “noncommercial” expression, as that 
term has been defined by the courts.  Nothing in this bill is intended 
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clearly states that “[n]othing in this bill is intended to alter 
existing case law on the subject of what constitutes 
‘commercial’ speech.”268  Even the Mattel court recognized that 
the “noncommercial use exemption does not . . . apply to 
commercial speech.”269  This recognition is crucial because it 
underlies the central problem with the Mattel court’s 
reasoning.  The Mattel court found dilution through blurring.270  
Blurring implicates primarily commercial motives and 
generally involves commercial speech.271  However, the Mattel 
court denied injunctive relief on the grounds that MCA’s speech 
was primarily non-commercial and therefore exempt under the 
non-commercial use exemption.272  Thus the court’s denial of 
injunctive relief for dilutitive blurring under the non-
commercial use exemption contradicts the court’s earlier 
recognition that the exemption applies only to non-commercial 
speech.  If the exemption was truly limited to non-commercial 
speech then the Mattel Court should have granted injunctive 
relief because MCA’s speech was both commercial and non-
commercial. 
Without doubt, MCA’s use was non-commercial 
expression,273 even though it simultaneously used Mattel’s 
mark for commercial purposes in commerce.274  Mattel’s 
insignificant blurring injury, and relatively small dilutitive 
tarnishment injury, was heavily outweighed by MCA’s strong 
First Amendment expressive interests.275  This analysis would 
leave room to grant dilution injunctions when, notwithstanding 

to alter existing case law on the subject of what constitutes 
“commercial” speech.  The bill includes specific language exempting 
from liability the “fair use” of a mark in the context of comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion as well as all forms of news 
reporting and news commentary.  The latter provision which was 
added to H.R. 1295 as a result of an amendment offered by 
Congressman Moorhead that was adopted by the Committee, 
recognize[d] the heightened First Amendment protection afforded the 
news industry. 
Id. 
 268. Id. (emphasis added). 
 269. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 905 n.7. 
 270. See id. at 904 n.5. 
 271. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 272. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907 (stating “[u]se of the Barbie mark in the song 
Barbie Girl . . . falls within the noncommercial use exemption”); see generally 
supra notes 192-212 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 203, 264 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 185. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 252, 253. 
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some minimal level of First Amendment content, the dilutitive 
blurring injury is significant because the junior user’s primary 
interest is commercial.  This would be analogous to the Nabisco 
facts where the court found that Pepperidge Farm’s dilutitive 
blurring injury weighed in favor of an injunction because 
Nabisco’s primary interest was commercial. 276  Any artistic 
First Amendment interest Nabisco had in marketing goldfish 
shaped crackers was easily outweighed by Pepperidge Farm’s 
interest in maintaining the property-like value of its 
trademarked cracker.277  Similarly, the Am. Dairy Queen278 
court granted an injunction against defendant New Line 
because they conceded that there was no expressive content in 
its chosen title.279  Although ADQ’s injury was primarily 
through dilutitive tarnishment, Am. Dairy Queen illustrates 
that a dilutitive interest can outweigh a First Amendment 
expressive interest. 
Going back to the “Cadillac of toilets” hypothetical posed in 
this article’s introduction,280 a court following the Mattel line of 
reasoning would consider American Standard’s expressive right 
to use Cadillac’s mark and weigh that right directly against 
Cadillac’s investment interest in its mark.  A Mattel analysis 
would find that American Standard’s use constitutes a 
commercial use in commerce: “Cadillac” is used to sell 
American Standard products.  At the same time, American 
Standard’s use is non-commercial: “Cadillac” emanates 
American Standard’s views about American-made luxury 
products.  Thus, a Mattel analysis would find that because the 
commercial and non-commercial speech are inextricably 
entwined (both messages emanate from the same mark), 
American Standard’s use would be excepted under the FTDA’s 
non-commercial use exemption and no injunction would issue. 
In contrast, under the reasoning proposed by this 

 276. See Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 225 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 277. Cf. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900  (stating “[w]hatever first amendment 
rights you may have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub ‘Pepsi’ are 
easily outweighed by the buyer’s interest in not being fooled into buying it”) 
(quoting Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L.REV. 960, 973 
(1993)).  Both assertions rely on the rationale behind the respective theory 
(dilution of infringement) and weigh the interest against the First 
Amendment. 
 278. Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 
(D.Minn. 1998). 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 101. 
 280. See supra Introduction. 
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comment, Cadillac is faced with a more sinister problem than 
ADQ because American Standard’s use is primarily 
commercial, like New Line’s use, but American Standard’s 
expressive use is secondary and incorporates its own 
commercial motivation to associate its toilets with Cadillac.281  
Remember that New Line conceded that its junior use lacked 
expressive content.282  If a court analyzes the separate types of 
injury as this comment proposes,283 it would find that Cadillac’s 
dilutitive blurring injury is significant given the substantial 
commercial intent behind American Standard’s use.  
Furthermore, American Standard’s relatively minor expressive 
interest would be weighed against Cadillac’s substantial 
investment in its trademark.  Both issues are for the fact 
finders, but it is clear that under this analysis, Cadillac is in a 
relatively stronger position.  It is important to note that 
Cadillac could not get this far under Mattel: the Mattel court 
would find that any non-commercial expression by American 
Standard precludes an FTDA dilution injunction.284 
In sum, the distinction between dilutitive blurring and 
dilutitive tarnishment implicates the First Amendment in 
different and meaningful ways.  The Mattel court failed to 
appreciate this distinction, and as a result, completely 
discounted Mattel’s property-like value in its mark.285  This was 
in direct contravention to Congress’s intent to provide 
protection for a trademark’s property-like value through the 
FTDA.286 
B. TRADEMARK KONG LIVES 
This section explains why the Mattel court’s statement that 
“[i]f speech is not ‘purely commercial’ – that is, if it does more 
than propose a commercial transaction – then it is entitled to 

 281. See supra Introduction; see e.g., supra text accompanying note 20. 
 282. New Line’s lack of expressive content meant that both dilution 
injuries fall in ADQ’s favor.  See text accompanying note 279.  Here, American 
Standard has a purported expressive use argument.  A court failing to 
examine the nature of that expressive use would fail to see that the argument 
incorporates American Standard’s commercial intent.  See supra Introduction. 
 283. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 284. See Mattel, 296 F.3d 906-07 (concluding that MCA’s speech is “not 
purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully protected”). 
 285. See id. 
 286. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also supra Section 
III.A.1. 
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full First Amendment protection”287 could mean the end of any 
substantive protection offered by the FTDA to owners of 
famous and distinctive marks.288  The reason the court’s 
statement is so important to trademark dilution is that most 
junior users combine both expressive commentary and 
expression “related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker”289 when diluting senior marks.  Thus, the court’s 
notion that “not purely commercial”290 expression is fully 
protected under the First Amendment means that most senior 
mark holders will be unable to obtain an FTDA injunction.  The 
key to resolving Mattel’s First Amendment marginalization of 
the FTDA is to recognize that the commercial speech doctrine 
treats commercial speech as being lower on the First 
Amendment hierarchy.291  However, as exhibited by the 
Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of commercial speech, 
it is hard to say how much lower.292 
Central Hudson293 stands for the proposition that the 
government may restrict commercial speech if the restriction is 
justified by a substantial government interest and the 
regulation directly advances that interest.294  Examination of 
the legislative history behind the FTDA reveals that Congress’ 
was aware of the tension between the proposed Act and the 
First Amendment.295  Congress justified the Act’s restriction on 

 287. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (citing Hoffman v. Capital Ciies/ABC, Inc, 255 
F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 288. See generally supra Introduction (explaining the Cadillac hypothetical 
and the absurd result from protecting American Standard’s interest in 
espousing its views on American luxury consumerism). 
 289. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 
561 (1980).  See also supra text accompanying note 199. 
 290. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (quotes omitted). 
 291. See supra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text (discussing Ohralik 
and McGowan’s critique of the court’s underlying rationale).  Notwithstanding 
McGowan’s excellent argument, “speech” in the dilution cases often is a form 
of economic activity and the Mattel court’s hostile FTDA treatment could be 
construed as “using the First Amendment as a pretext for implementing [the 
court’s] economic polices.”  See McGowan, supra note 119, at 440.  Therefore, 
Jackson & Jeffries observation is relevant to the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values: that “commercial speech is not ‘speech’ for first 
amendment purposes, it is actually part of the economic marketplace and may 
be regulated as economic activity.”  Id. 
 292. See supra Section I.B.4. 
 293. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 294. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text. 
 295. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1031. 
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commercial speech through the recognition of “the substantial 
investment the owner has made in the mark and the 
commercial value and aura of the mark itself.”296  Furthermore, 
the FTDA is limited in its applicability: it directly advances the 
government’s interest and simultaneously accommodates First 
Amendment concerns because it narrowly extends protection 
only to famous and distinctive marks.297  Thus the FTDA meets 
the preliminary standard to validly restrict commercial speech 
by Central Hudson. 
Another important inquiry into understanding the 
intersection between the FTDA and the First Amendment 
commercial speech doctrine is “how much First Amendment 
protection does commercial speech deserve?”  The FTDA was 
passed before 44 Liquormart298 was handed down.299  Kathleen 
Sullivan’s insightful analysis of the commercial speech doctrine 
before 44 Liquormart points out that, commercial speech is 
protected, but is not fully protected.300  44 Liquormart was 
arguably inconsistent with previous commercial speech cases 
and appeared to signal a retreat from the idea that commercial 
speech deserved less than full protection.301  Nevertheless, 44 
Liquormart was doctrinally important because it supported the 
argument that commercial speech deserves the same protection 
that non-commercial speech receives.302  However, after 44 
Liquormart, the Supreme Court seems to take a more moderate 
approach in Thompson,303 affirming the Bolger Court’s holding 
that commercial speech enjoys “qualified but nonetheless 
substantial [First Amendment] protection.”304  The Bolger 
Court’s “substantial First Amendment protection” language 
was protective of the advertisement’s content 
(contraceptives).305  However, where the speech is related 

 296. Id. at 1030; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63. 
 298. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 299. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 127. 
 301. See id. at 126. 
 302. Id. (stating “after Liquormart, it is unclear why ‘commercial speech’ 
should continue to be treated as a separate category of speech isolated from 
general First Amendment principles”). 
 303. See Thompson v. Western States Medical, 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) 
(stating “although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, 
not all regulation of such speech is unconstitutional”). 
 304. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68. 
 305. See id. at 60. 
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purely to the economic desire of the advertiser in contravention 
to an asserted substantial governmental interest, it is clear 
that the Court would be less likely to protect such speech.306  
Similarly, where the commercial speech is dilutitive, a court 
should be less interested in protecting such speech under the 
First Amendment because it is less central to people’s abilities 
to express themselves and in direct contravention to an 
asserted substantial governmental interest.307  However, this 
only tells us part of the reason why commercial speech receives 
less than full First Amendment protection. 
As illustrated above in Section I.B.3 and III.A.2, dilutitive 
injury can occur through blurring and tarnishment.  
Furthermore, dilutitive speech can consist of commercial and 
non-commercial speech.  In other words, the junior user’s 
dilutitive use of a senior mark can consist of expressive 
commentary about the senior mark combined with commercial 
expression “related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker.”308  Thus, there is a hierarchy of dilutitive use 
situations as follows:309 
Dilutitive use that tarnishes, and consists of: 
1. Only expressive commentary – implicates full First 
Amendment protection. 
2. Some expressive commentary and some commercial 
expression – implicates balancing between both of 
the following: 
 Expressive commentary implicates full First 
Amendment protection 
 Commercial expression implicates the Bolger 
standard of less than full First Amendment 
protection under the commercial speech 
doctrine 

 306. See TRAUTH & HUFFMAN, supra note 114, at 109-111.  The Posadas 
Court distinguished “Carey and Bigelow [because] the underlying conduct that 
was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally 
protected . . . [whereas] the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have 
prohibited casino gambling.”  Id. at 110. 
 307. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-1031. 
 308. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 309. On this scale, using the Ohralik concept of the First Amendment 
hierarchy, Situation #1 (only expressive commentary) receives the fullest First 
Amendment protection and Situation #4 (only commercial expression) receives 
the level of First Amendment protection dictated by the current 
understanding of the commercial speech doctrine.  See Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
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Dilutitive use that blurs, and consists of: 
3. Some commercial expression and some expressive 
commentary – implicates balancing between both of 
the following: 
 Expressive commentary implicates full First 
Amendment protection 
 Commercial expression implicates the Bolger 
standard of less than full First Amendment 
protection under the commercial speech 
doctrine 
4. Only commercial expression310 – implicates the 
Bolger standard of less than full First Amendment 
protection under the commercial speech doctrine. 
It is clear from this hierarchy that a court must analyze 
the relative amounts of expressive and commercial speech 
occurring in the junior user’s dilutitive use and compare that 
with the type of dilution, thus determining the relative 
amounts of dilution.  This also emphasizes the importance for 
future courts of examining fully the distinct dilutitive injuries 
that arise from the different junior uses of a senior mark.311 
Therefore, Mattel court should have first examined the 
types of speech, and then the types of dilution claimed.  Under 
this method, the Mattel court should have found that MCA’s 
expressive speech, combined with very little commercial 
speech312 is very close to the Situation #1 on the above 
hierarchy (only expressive commentary).  Furthermore, in 
examining the types of blurring, the Mattel court would have 
found that Mattel’s claim for dilutitive blurring in fact supports 
a finding for MCA because blurring implicates Situation #3, 
both commercial and non-commercial speech.  Commercial 
speech is lower on Ohralik’s First Amendment hierarchy than 
expressive speech and MCA’s expressive speech was a 
significant part of its total speech.  Therefore the Mattel court 
was justified in denying the dilution injunction on First 

 310. If Jackson & Jeffries are correct that “commercial speech is not 
‘speech’ for first amendment purposes” then only commercial speech in the 
hierarchy above raises no first amendment concerns.  This is exactly the result 
shown in Nabisco: Nabisco’s dilutitive blurring use did not implicate any First 
Amendment concerns because its use could be thought of as only commercial 
speech and therefore there is no First Amendment concern.  See Jackson & 
Jeffries, supra note 121. 
 311. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 312. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment grounds.313 
In contrast, going back to the “Cadillac of toilets” 
hypothetical posed in this article’s introduction,314 a court using 
the above hierarchy would be justified in giving American 
Standard’s “Made in the U.S.A.” argument relatively little 
weight because Cadillac’s injury stems primarily from dilutitive 
blurring.  Dilutitive blurring involves relatively little 
expressive commentary315 and so a court would be justified in 
discounting American Standard’s First Amendment defense.  
Thus a court would be justified in granting Cadillac’s dilution 
injunction notwithstanding American Standard’s First 
Amendment defense, represented by Situation #4. 
In sum, the Mattel court’s statement that any speech that 
“is not ‘purely commercial’ . . . is entitled to full First 
Amendment protection” should be construed very narrowly and 
treated as an endpoint along a continuum.316  First, the First 
Amendment should be weighed to gauge what kinds of speech 
are present.  Then that speech should be weighed against the 
FTDA and only in rare cases will one absolutely preclude the 
other’s rights.  For example, when the commercial speech does 
not consist of sensitive content but instead is the expressed 
commercial intention to trade on the goodwill of another’s 
mark, then relatively little, if any, commercial First 
Amendment concern is raised.317  In contrast, when the non-
commercial expression comments on the senior user’s mark and 
contains sensitive content, the strongest non-commercial First 
Amendment protections are raised.318  With these distinctions 
in mind, the conclusion is significant that First Amendment 
rights, although powerful, do not apply universally to all 
trademark dilution situations. 

 313. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 314. See supra, Introduction. 
 315. The junior user’s reason for using the senior mark is primarily 
commercial – American Standard is not selling toilets to make a statement, it 
is selling toilets to make money, and using Cadillac’s mark to make more 
money.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added). 
 317. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
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IV.CONCLUSION**** 
In cases like Am. Dairy Queen, Nabisco, Mattel and the 
hypothetical Cadillac v. American Standard, it is evident that 
detailed analysis of the intersection between the speech at 
issue and the FTDA is required because there could be 
instances where some non-commercial speech does not deserve 
protection under the First Amendment.  This view is premised 
on (1) a theory that Congress attempted to protect the property-
like interests in trademarks; (2) a theory that the tension 
between the FTDA and the First Amendment is reduced by the 
FTDA’s requirements of famousness and distinctiveness; (3) 
that commercial speech deserves less protection than non-
commercial speech; and (4) that the FTDA advances a 
substantial government interest and can therefore regulate 
some forms of speech.  This involves a critical balancing of 
rights between the expression involved and the mark holder’s 
property-like interest.  While this comment does not dispute 
that expressive rights are powerful and should rarely be 
curtailed, there are instances where protecting valued 
commercial resources should be a judicial priority, as they have 
been a legislative priority.  Without such protection, the 
incentive to invest in a mark’s distinctiveness is diminished.  
Consequently, the value society attributes to that mark, and to 
future marks, will be reduced.  This reduction in value may 
have adverse consequences on the consumer public because the 
average cost of goods and services may increase.  Consumers 
will be forced to pay premiums in order to guarantee quality, 
and by definition those premiums will include the mechanism 
to accommodate the business’s expense in finding alternate 
methods of reaching out to new customers.  Thus, the FTDA’s 
accommodation of limited dilution rights against defendants 
who genuinely have little or no non-commercial expression will 
respect legitimate First Amendment values, promote expansion 
in property wealth and generally expand the number of entities 
that generate some form of alternative public commentary. 

**** “After this remarkably long walk on a short legal pier . . . the [author] has 
endeavored . . . out of its own sense of morbid curiosity, to resolve what it 
perceived to be the legal issue presented.”  Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 
Inc 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (Kent, District Judge, 
demonstrating again the importance of humor in legal analysis). 
